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ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the impact of various government policies on
health. First, I study the effect of labor income taxes on health. Labor income
taxes are predicted to affect health through their impact on the value of time,
which is at the same time an important input but also the output of health
production. Using variation in labor income tax rates among US states, I find that
both higher taxes and more progressive taxes keeping tax liability constant lead to
a decline in health.
Second, I challenge the common wisdom that non-economic damage caps
on malpractice awards have a positive effect on medical care delivery. My
hypothesis is that caps may damage the quality assurance offered by physicians
through their willingness to pay the full cost of their medical mistakes. If that is
the case, the demand for medical services will decrease, and the net effect on the
quantity of medical services delivered is ambiguous. I find evidence that the
amount of medical services delivered to the population drops: caps lead to a
reduction of the number surgeries performed, the number of individuals treated
inpatient or outpatient in community hospitals, and to an increase in the average
length of hospitalization.
And third, I explore the issue of licensure requirements in health. I test the
hypothesis that current requirements are too strict using state variation in the

regulation of telemedicine practices. Telemedicine is predicted to offset the
impact of licensing by lowering the quality of the marginal medical services
delivered and easing access to medical care, but any regulation that prevents
telemedicine practices restores the state of the world originally envisaged by the
regulator. My results indicate that states that adopted regulation preventing
telemedicine experience an increase in mortality. The interpretation is that current
regulation preventing telemedicine has unwanted effects and, thus, I conclude that
since telemedicine, which partially offsets the impact of licensing, improves
health, current licensing requirements are too strict.
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DEATH AND TAXES:
THE IMPACT OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION ON HEALTH

Abstract
More progressive taxes, holding tax liability constant, generate
disincentives for health investment by decreasing benefits for additional working
time and, thus, decreasing returns to health. On the other hand, progressive
taxation may induce individuals to invest more in health for the purpose of
extending their working life, because lifetime maximization could imply less
work per period but more working years. I identify the effect of progressivity
through differences in labor income tax rates among states. I find that the former
effect dominates, more progressive taxes are negatively correlated with health,
and argue that neither selection effects nor reverse causality can explain this
result.
JEL Classifications: I12, I18, H24, D91
Keywords: Health Investment, Labor Income Tax, Tax Progressivity

Introduction
Understanding the factors that determine individuals’ investment in their
health is important in crafting effective health policies. In this paper I investigate
the relationship between fiscal policy and health investment and conclude that

both the average labor income tax rate and the progressivity of labor income tax
have a significant impact on health.
Grossman’s [1972] health investment model postulates that an increase in
wages encourages investment in health by raising the reward for this investment,
thus, suggesting that taxes negatively impact health. However, the issue of
progressive taxation has not been explored in the context of health yet. I argue
that since one important return to health investment is more time to earn wages, a
higher marginal tax rate on labor income reduces the incentives to invest in
health. At the same time, however, a more progressive tax system generates
incentives to inter-temporally substitute toward a longer working life [Ippolito,
1985], thus encouraging health investment. Tax progressivity also alters the input
mix used in health production by lowering the cost of the time input, introducing
inefficiency in health production.
Empirically, I identify the effect of a tax system from differences in the
tax rates on labor income in the state of residence. In each of the three different
surveys used, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), the
Current Population Survey (CPS) 2002, and the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System dataset (BRFSS) 2002, I measure the impact of increased
progressivity through changes in the ratio between the maximum tax rate and the
average tax rate on labor income in the state of residence, while keeping constant
the average tax rate. I find a negative impact on health from both the average
level and the progressivity of the labor income tax rates in the state of residence.
Specifically, my estimates obtained from NLSY79 indicate that a 1 percentage
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point increase in the average rate of taxation is associated with a cumulative
decline in health of 0.28 standard deviations by the age 40, and a 1 percentage
point increase in the maximum rate of taxation, keeping the average tax rate
constant, thus increasing progressivity, is associated with a cumulative decrease in
health of approximately 0.36 standard deviations by age 40. I argue that neither
selection effects nor reverse causality can explain these effects.
These findings contribute not only to our understanding of the incentives
that determine health investment, but also of the mechanics of the tax structure
impact on economic performance. Progressivity affects growth through its
influence on labor incentives, on investment in education and thus labor
productivity and perhaps health production efficiency, and on health investment
incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discuses
the issue of health production; Section 1.3 develops a model of income taxation
and health; Section 1.4 describes the empirical strategy; Section 1.5 presents and
discusses the findings, and Section 1.6 concludes.

Health Production
Grossman [1972] was the first to develop a model of health capital and
demand for health that motivated subsequent empirical work in health economics.
This study identifies some of the factors that can influence health such as
education, the cost of medical care, health depreciation rate (if it changes over
time), and the price of time. Empirically he finds that an increase in the hourly
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wage rate improves health, but it should be recognized that hourly wage rate
could be a function of health under the hypothesis that health increases
productivity or changes the number of hours worked.
Several of the factors identified by Grossman were subsequently studied in
an attempt to explain health outcomes and offer policy recommendations.
Lakdawalla and Phillipson [2002], for instance, suggest that the technological
innovations that lowered the price of food by shifting food production from the
household to the market may be an explanatory factor for the increase in the
intake of calories and obesity - based health problems. Others look at
technological innovations like fast food for an explanation. Since fast food does
not require a long preparation time it has a low cost per calorie consumed, leading
to increased caloric intake and obesity [Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro, 2003].
The pervasiveness of fast food as well as the amount of time spent
exercising, another health determinant, can be explained by the economic theory
of time allocation. Becker [1965] proposes that the higher the reward for work,
the higher the incentive to spend more time working and to consume less timeintensive commodities. In this case, people will prefer to eat out instead of
preparing food at home; will prefer types of food they do not have to wait for, i.e.
fast food; and in general will avoid time-intensive activities such as exercise.
Readily available statistics (OECD Productivity Database) indicate that
Americans tend to work longer hours than most of their counterparts in other
countries and, thus, according to the theory of time allocation should tend to use
fast-food more often. This tendency implies a higher incidence of diseases,
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situation supported by Banks et al. [2006] study. They provide evidence that a
higher proportion of the United States population age 55-64 reports having
various health problems than the similar segment of the population in England
(Table A3).
This theory also offers an explanation for the increase in medical
expenditures observed in the United States. As the value of time increases, people
try to substitute their own time with medical care in producing health. The
implication is that we should observe a higher incidence of disease due to less
home prevention in the United States, but perhaps a higher rate of cure due to
more medical care. Thus the relevant measure of health is not the incidence of
disease, but rather the number of unimpaired, productive days during lifetime. It
is not obvious that the impact of increased value of time on health as expressed by
life expectancy or number of productive days should be negative. This hypothesis
is consistent with the observed relatively small difference in life expectancy
between the countries postulated to have significant differences in disease
incidence (Life expectancy at birth in 2005 is 77.7 years for U.S. and 78.4 years
for UK; Source: Census Bureau, International Database). The hypothesis of a
higher incidence of diseases when the reward for work increases is also consistent
with observed counter-cyclical variations in health [Ruhm, 2000]. He finds that
smoking and obesity increase while physical activity and healthy diet habits
reduce during booms.
If the explanation for higher incidence of disease is that individuals
change the input mix used for health production, it is no longer obvious that
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spending more time enhancing health will necessarily improve health, as
expressed by life expectancy or number of unimpaired days, or promote growth.
People already are making rational decisions, maximizing their lifetime income.
Forcing them to use more of their own time in health production rather than
medical care, which is less time intensive but requires higher financial
expenditures, is a constraint that cannot lead to higher income. Even though
health improvements that reduce medical spending provide significant scope for
growth [Murphy and Topel, 2005] it is not obvious that these should come from
allocating more time to health production. The loss of a lower lifetime income
may offset any gains from decreased health expenditures.
Consequently, if increased reward for work leads to a higher incidence of
diseases and higher medical expenditures, a plausible implication is that the
United States is only the first country to experience this trend because it has the
highest labor productivity. In the future as countries develop, the same trend will
be observed elsewhere1. Once it is acknowledged that this trend is the rational
implication of a desirable increase in labor productivity and, thus, in the reward
for work, it should also be acknowledged that the solution for health problems
may not lie in making people spend more of their own time in health production.
Rather it may be found in either the increase in the reward for health coming from
1

International Obesity Task Force, EU Platform on Diet, Physical Activity and Health,

March 15, 2005: “A marked trend towards increasing levels of adult overweight and obesity can
be found throughout Europe, although there are variations in prevalence.” available at
http://www.publico.clix.pt/docs/pesoemedida/EU_Platform_Diet_PA_Health_2005.pdf
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an increase in the retirement age, or in the decrease in the cost of health
production through medical innovations that reduce the price of medical care.
This postulated significant effect of the value of time on health behavior
represents the motivation for this study. The way to test the effect of changes in
the value of time on health is to look at the effect of exogenous factors that
change the value of time. Differences among state tax systems provide a plausible
exogenous variation among the value of time of otherwise identical individuals.
Specifically, this paper explores the effect of the progressivity of the system of
taxation on health in a time allocation setting. Progressive taxation, which affects
health choices by changing the relative gain from investment, is most relevant in
health context because it is one of the policy tools that generate an inter-temporal
distortion.
In regard to the issue of taxation, the relevant question is the effect of
increasing progressivity while keeping the average tax rate or the tax revenue
constant. Sandmo [1983] addressed this problem with respect to labor supply. For
the representative consumer, progressive taxation reduces labor supply compared
with a flat tax that brings the same revenues. Overall, through increased
progression, the average tax rate falls for low income people but rises for high
income individuals, indicating that there is a negative income effect for part of the
population, a positive income effect for the other, and a negative substitution
effect for everybody. The overall effect on the total labor supply is a function of
the relative sizes of these effects. Empirical studies like the one conducted by
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Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980] suggest that these effects offset one another in the
case of aggregate labor supply.
Ippolito [1985] argues that higher progression creates incentives for intertemporal substitution. Workers may prefer to work less before the usual
retirement age but continue working after retirement age, an effect found to be
statistically significant in the empirical analysis conducted on Social Security
Newly Entitled Beneficiaries Survey data. Another effect of progressivity is
identified by Gentry and Hubbard [2002], who argue that an increase in the
degree of progression will decrease job search as it decreases the rewards from
the search. Their estimates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics support this
theory.
Similar to Ippolito’s [1985] paper, I argue that increased progressivity
could induce individuals to invest more in health for the purpose of extending
their active life because lifetime maximization, when the duration of life can be
chosen through health investment, may be associated with fewer labor hours per
period but more working periods. In other words since health investment extends
the duration of life, it can also provide a way of avoiding high marginal tax rates
by smoothing taxes over a longer period of time. However, there is an opposite
effect: if progressivity discourages work and decreases utility, it also generates
disincentives for health investment. In addition, it leads to inefficient health
production by distorting the input mix because it changes the price of the time
input. Consequently, I expect that the degree of tax progressivity has a significant
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impact on health investment in addition to the effect of tax level identified by
Grossman [1972].
This paper uses individual level data to investigate the impact of
progressive taxation on health by first developing a health-investment type of
model and then testing empirically the effects of tax system progressivity on the
flow of health. I identify the effect of tax progressivity through differences in
labor income taxes among states. The empirical results indicate that controlling
for the level of the tax more progressive income taxes are associated with
declining health.

The Theoretical Model
The investment model of health proposes that individuals use their time as
well as medical care to produce a stock of health, which, in turn, determines the
duration of life. This paper investigates the impact of progressive taxation on
health in the setting of an health investment model.
Let the individual’s utility be increasing at a decreasing rate in
consumption (c) and leisure (l):

Ut =

1

log(ct ) +

2

log(lt ) , where O1, O2, (O1 + O2) <1

(1)

Investments in health determine the amount of time available to be divided among
health production, market production, and leisure. Health is produced using time
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(x) and medical care (m). The Cobb-Douglas in logs production function of health
is defined as:

Qt = A +

1

log( xt ) +

2

log(mt )

(2)

where Qt denotes output, mt is medical care, R1 +R2 <1, and A is a parameter
dependent on human capital (S).

Total human capital is considered exogenous in the sense that the accumulation
period has already ended. Health depreciates at a rate (S), which increases with
time, so the dynamics of the health stock (Dt) are described by:

•

Dt = A +

1

log( xt ) +

2

log(mt )

Dt

(3)

The cost of investment is measured by the time spent producing health that could
have been used for other purposes (xt) and by the cost of medical care. In this
model the gain from investing in health comes from a longer life, allowing for
more periods in which the individual can earn wages or enjoy leisure. The period
is counted as a standard measure of healthy time; thus, the total time available
each period is normalized to 1, and the number of periods available is a function
of the stock of health. Therefore, the time spent working each period is (1-xt-lt),
and the pre-tax total income (It) each period is calculated as earned wage, which is
a function of human capital (S), multiplied by the amount of time spent working.
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I t = (1 xt lt ) w

(4)

The amount of money available for utility enhancing consumption is determined
by the income earned, and by the amount of tax liability and of medical
expenditures.

ct = w(1 xt lt ) T ( w(1 xt lt ))

pm mt

(5)

where T(w(1-xt-lt )) is the tax function and pm is the price of medical care.

This model suggests a trade-off between using time for market production
versus health production, similar to the one that occurs in any specialization
decision in which gains from trade provide incentives toward production
specialization. However, in reality the specialization decision with respect to
health versus market production bears some particularities.
First, specialization can occur only if trade takes place: when people
choose to specialize in producing a specific product or service, there is an
underlying assumption that the goods and services they no longer produce can be
acquired on the market. Health cannot be bought, nor is it obvious that health can
be produced using the only input that can be bought, medical care. Even if it
could be, the quality of medical services is hard to evaluate without having
specific knowledge. Obtaining specific knowledge requires a time investment,
bringing us back to the point that all persons are in charge of producing their own
health and that health production technology is always going to involve time use.
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The second particularity refers to the way health production is affected by
taxes. Wages earned in different occupations are taxed similarly under the income
tax. On the other hand, the output of health production is not taxed directly:
taxation affects only the product, healthy time, used for market production. In the
case of market production, the worker receives the value of his output in the form
of wages that are immediately taxed. In the case of health production, the increase
in the stock of health is not taxed in the period of occurrence but will be taxed
when the healthy time produced is used for work. It can be said that taxes
corresponding to the health output produced this period are paid in the future with
the extended active life. Because of this delay between obtaining the output and
the moment when taxes are due, taxation generates an inter-temporal substitution
effect that represents an incentive to produce health. This effect should moderate
the direct effect of the decreased incentives to invest in health associated with the
decrease in wages by taxation noted by Grossman [1972].
A more interesting case is that of progressive taxation. Progressive
taxation exacerbates the issue just described because the marginal tax increases
with wages and, thus, with time spent working each period. As a result, for the
representative individual, a progressive tax decreases the incentives to invest in
health compared with a proportional tax bringing the same revenue. But since
health production can be used to shift resources between periods, lifetime
maximization could be associated with earning a smaller wage per period but
working more periods, i.e. living longer. This second effect acts as an incentive to
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invest in health. Thus, the overall effect of increased progressivity is a function of
the relative magnitude of these two effects.
Under progressive taxation the amount of tax increases with income at an
increasing rate, such that the marginal rate of taxation is always higher than the
average rate of taxation. Accordingly, T(w(1-xt-lt)), the tax liability in this model,
indicates that the amount of tax is a function of income. For the rest of this paper,
T =dT/d(w(1-xt-lt)) will denote the marginal rate of taxation and V =T /(w(1-xt-lt))
the average rate of taxation.
The dynamics of this model are described by the current value
Hamiltonian (Hc) below. The length of lifetime is chosen by the individual
through the choice of stock of health. When the stock of health drops below
Dmin, the individual dies.

Hc =

1

+

log( w(1 xt lt ) T ( w(1 xt lt ))
t

(A+

1

log( xt ) +

2

log(mt )

Dt )

pm mt ) +

2

log(lt ) +

(6)

The system of equations representing the first order conditions necessary for the
maximization is presented below.
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FOC:

w(1
lt )(1

)
)

pm mt

w(1 xt

w(1
lt )(1

)
)

pm mt

w(1 xt

pm
lt )(1 )

1

w(1 xt

1

1

•

Dt = A +
•
t

log( xt ) +

1

=( + )

D1st

period

1st period

pm mt

2

=

=

=

t

1

(7)

xt
2

(8)

lt
t

2

mt

(9)

log( mt )

Dt

(10)
(11)

t

= Do

(12)

=

(13)

0

( Do )

In this problem, W is the discount rate, and Xt is the Lagrange multiplier
representing the shadow value of health. The above system of equations
completely characterizes the time path of the stock and the shadow value of
health.
This system implies that the amount of time spent investing in health is:

xt =

t 1

(

1

+

t

2

)+(

(1
(1
2

)
)
+

t

(1
1)
(1

)
)

14

(14)

As a result, the fraction above can be interpreted as the share of the total time
available each period being used for health production. In the case of a
proportional income tax, the marginal rate of taxation is equal to the average rate
of taxation: T = V; thus, the fraction of healthy time spent for health production
becomes:

t 1

(

1+

2) +

t

(

1

+

2

)

. But the higher the difference between the

marginal rate of taxation and the average rate, i.e., the more progressive the tax
system, the higher will be the share of healthy time spent on health.
On the other hand, the more progressive the tax system, the lower the
amount of medical care purchased:

mt = w

1
pm (

t
1

+

t

2

2

)+(

(1
2

)
+

(1
1)
(1

t

(15)

)
)

This relationship also indicates that the amount of medical care decreases with an
increase in the level of the tax rate.
Given the results above, total investment in health is given by:

INVt = Gt +

2

log(1

where Gt = A +

1

log(

)+

t 1

1

log

)+

2

(1
(1

)
( 1+
)

log(

t

2

2

w / pm )

15

) log[(

1

+

t

2

)+(

2

+

t 1

)

(1
(1

)
]
)

Therefore, the model predicts that higher tax levels decrease health investment,
but does not offer a clear prediction of the impact of progressivity:

dINVt
=
(1 ) (1
d
(1 ) (1

1

(

1

+

)
[(
)

t

1

+

2

)
t

2

2

(

2

)+(

+
2

+

t 1

t

(1 )
(1 )
(1 )
]
1)
(1 )

)

(16)

The sign of this expression, given by the sign of the numerator, is uncertain. The
actual direction of change of health investment, and thus of health, is ultimately
an empirical question. The investment determines the stock of health; thus,
controlling for the original level of health, the effect of taxation on health stock is
completely determined by its effect on health investment.
An implication of this model is that the share of healthy time spent for
investment tends toward a constant as the shadow value of health increases. Since
the shadow value of health increases with age, Xt = Xo + exp((S+W)t), the share of
time invested in health also increases with age, leveling off at a constant. The
same happens with medical care spending. However, since the depreciation rate
of health also increases with time, at some point the stock of health drops below a
minimum value, and the individual dies. At high values of the shadow value of
health, it is more likely that the effect of progressivity on health investment is
negative.
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Empirical Strategy
The theoretical model suggests that the stock of health is determined by:

Dt=Dt (D0, T, V, X, Y),
where D0 is the initial stock of health; X is a vector of controls among which is the
price of medical care, Y is a vector of parameters specific to each individual: O1,
O2, R1, R2, W, S, A, and S education. Thus health is a function not only of the tax
level but also of the tax progressivity.
Measuring Progressivity
As the theoretical model suggests, the impact of a progressive system of
taxation is captured by the ratio of the marginal tax rate and the average tax rate
while controlling for the average tax level in the state of residence. We observe
the wage earned by the individual; thus, the average and marginal rate of tax can
be calculated for each person, but these measures are endogenous as they are
functions of the time spent working, which is endogenous in the model. Also,
hourly wage, sometimes used to construct measures of the marginal tax faced by
each person, is endogenous if wage is a function of the number of daily hours of
work. A solution to this problem would be to use an exogenous measure of the tax
level and the degree of progressivity of the tax system constraining individuals.
Such a measure is the state level ratio of the marginal tax rate for a maximum
level of income and the average tax rate. This ratio measures the growth of the tax
rate with income. For instance, between two states having the same maximum rate
of taxation, the state with a higher average rate has a less progressive system

17

because it means that low income people are taxed at a higher rate in this state
compared with the other. In other words, for states having the same maximum
rate but a higher average rate, the marginal tax rate increases at a slower rate with
income. Similarly, between two states with the same average tax rate, the one
with a higher maximum tax rate has a more progressive system as it means that
low income individuals are taxed at a lower rate, i.e. the tax rate increases faster
with income.
The caveat of measuring progressivity by this ratio is that it assumes a
smooth tax schedule, ignoring the possible kinks generated by constant marginal
tax rates within the brackets. Using this ratio it would be impossible to measure
accurately the effects of an income tax reform on health just as it can not be done
for labor supply [Hausman, 1981]. Moreover, all the issues generated by a
negative income tax [Burtless and Hausman, 1978] or by any kind of tax system
generating non-convexities in the after-tax income schedule are also relevant for
health choices. As previous surveys [Hausman, 1985; Pencavel, 1986] indicate,
using piecewise linear constraints delivers different results in the case of labor
supply and, thus, has the same effect in the case of health. Nevertheless, the ratio
between the marginal and the average tax rate at an exogenous level of income
alone is sufficient for investigating the main point of the paper, the existence of a
significant effect of the tax progressivity on health, and offers the advantage of
simplicity. Given that studies incorporating piecewise-linear constraints indicate
larger labor supply responses, my approach will at most underestimate the
negative effect of progressivity on health.
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Empirical Specification
The empirical analysis uses individual level data to test the effect of tax
progressivity on health. Considering only taxes would not account for the entire
picture of the effect of government on health choices. It may be the case that
people with health problems move where the health care system is better. If the
quality of health care is correlated with state expenditures for hospitals, then
where taxes are higher and the state spends more on health care, there are also
more people with health problems. To account for this possibility, the regression
analysis controls for the level of health and hospital expenditures in the state of
residence.
Another issue arises from the fact that health production uses two inputs:
time and medical care, so there may be substitution in production. The empirical
analysis acknowledges that changes in the price of medical care influences health
outcomes by controlling for the differences in the median hourly wages of the
medical personnel in the state of residence.
Given these considerations, testing the effect of progressive taxation uses
the following model specification.

Model 1: OLS on NLSY79 and BRFSS data/ Ordered probit on CPS
Healthi=a0 + a1(Tax progressivity)i + a2(Tax level)i + a3(Price of medical care)i +
a4(State health expenditures)i + a5(I)i + a6(R) + ei
where I is a vector individual characteristics variables and R is a vector of state
demographics.
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A source of concern with the estimates obtained from this specification is
that individuals self-select themselves with respect to their state of residence. For
instance, people who are more efficient at producing wages may prefer to live in
states with less progressive systems of taxation. If health also increases labor
productivity, then healthier people may choose to locate in states with less
progressive income taxes, introducing a bias toward a more negative estimator of
the effect of progressivity on health. On the other hand, people who value health
more and prefer to spend a lot of time exercising instead of working may choose a
state with more progressive taxes in order to benefit from the lower tax rates
applied to the lowest income brackets. In this case health is positively correlated
with progressivity and the coefficients obtained would be biased toward a more
positive estimate. The instrumental variable technique is used to correct for this
possibility, the proposed instruments being the property crime rate in the state, the
ratio of Democrats to Republicans in the state House, and the same ratio in the
Senate, severance tax revenues per capita and the state population.
A high crime rate is the result insufficient law enforcement, indicative of
poor police financing. This suggests that the property crime rate is correlated with
state expenditures, which are financed by higher taxes and, thus, is also correlated
with the tax level. The property crime rate in a state is exogenous as it is not
correlated with health production efficiency, so it has the potential of being a
good instrument for the tax level. If political beliefs influence the way people vote
for taxes, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans is a good indicator of both tax
levels and progressivity too. Moreover, since it is not obvious that political
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preferences are in any way correlated with health, the ratios of Democrats to
Republicans in the state House or Senate are good instruments for the tax system.
Severance tax revenues are postulated to be correlated with labor income taxes
because they represent a good substitute for labor income taxes. Since their base
of taxation, natural resources, is fixed severance taxes are very hard to avoid,
making severance taxes a good alternative for labor income taxes. As a result they
should be strongly negatively correlated with labor income tax rates while at the
same time not correlated with health. Hansen and Kessler [2001] argue that state
population is an important determinant in the emergence of tax heavens because
under sorting smaller states have a more homogenous population lowering
political conflict and creating the conditions for the creations of “tax heavens”.
Thus the tax system should be strongly correlated with the state population. At the
same time there is no reason to believe that state population affects an
individual’s health. The only way this would be true is if population would be
strongly correlated with population density, but the coefficient of correlation
between population and population density is 0.049.
I also acknowledge that there may be selection into states based on state
health expenditures and instrument for this variable. The proposed instrument is
state government employment- full time equivalent as a share of population. Since
a significant share of government employment is occupied in health related fields,
higher government employment is expected to be strongly positively correlated
with state health and hospital expenditures. With these instruments, the following
model specification is estimated.

21

Model 2: 2SLS model
First stage:
Tax progressivityi=b0 + b1(Property crime rate)i + b2(Dem/Rep ratio House)i +
b3(Dem/Rep ratio Senate)i + b4(Severance Tax)i + b5(Government Employment)i +
b6(Population)i + b7(E)i+ui
Tax leveli= c0 + c1(Property crime rate)i + c2(Dem/Rep ratio House)i +
c3(Dem/Rep ratio Senate)i + c4(Severance Tax)i + c5(Government Employment)i +
c6(Population)i + c7(E)i+ui
State health expendituresi= d0 + d1(Property crime rate)i + d2(Dem/Rep ratio
House)i + d3(Dem/Rep ratio Senate)i + d4(Severance Tax)i + d5(Government
Employment)i + d6(Population)i + d7(E)i+ui
(where E is the vector of exogenous variables from the health regression)
Second stage:
Healthi=a0 + a1(Tax progressivity)i + a2(Tax level)i + a3(Price of medical care)i +
a4(State health expenditures)i+ a5(I)i+ +a6(R)i + ei

Data and Estimation Results
The empirical analysis uses a measure of health from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youths 1979 (NLSY79), the physical score determined
based on the SF12 survey (higher score means healthier) administered to
individuals turning 40 in 1998, 2000, and 2002 for a cross-section analysis. The
SF-12 survey, the 12 question survey (Appendix) designed by John Ware of the
New England Medical Center Hospital, was meant to give a health assessment not
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conditioned by the individual propensity to use medical services. This survey is
considered reliable when samples are sufficiently large and the objective is to
monitor overall physical and mental health outcomes. As the objective of this
paper is exactly to measure the overall level of health, these scores provide a good
measure for this purpose. But it should be recognized that this physical score
suffers from measurement error as it is based on survey data [Baker, Stabile and
Deri, 2001]. I acknowledge this potential problem and check the robustness of the
results on two additional datasets that provide other measures of health. First, the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System dataset (BRFSS) provides a measure
of the number of days of poor physical health in the month prior to the interview,
and second, the Current Population Survey (CPS) has a measure of self-reported
health ranking from excellent to poor.
In all datasets I use the 2002 state level marginal tax rate at a maximum
level of income and the average tax rate on labor income calculated by Daniel
Feenberg using the TAXSIM model (Table 1.1) for constructing the tax variables.
The maximum tax rate represents “the maximum tax rate for an additional $1000
of income on an initial $500,000 of wage income (split evenly between husband
and wife) given that the taxpayer is assumed to be married and filing jointly. This
rate allows for a mortgage interest deduction of $50,000 and the calculated state
income tax as personal deductions” [Feenberg and Coutts, 1993]. The average
marginal income tax rate was calculated using a nationally representative sample
of individuals, isolating the effect of the tax system from the impact of the state
characteristics.
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Table 1.1 Tax Rates on Labor Income by State

Maximum Tax Rate1

Average Tax Rate1, 2

Tax

STATE

Wages 2002

Wages 2002

Progressivity3

Alabama

41.64

27.52

151.308

Alaska

39.76

24.43

162.751

Arizona

42.78

27.29

156.761

Arkansas

44.18

28.64

154.260

California

45.81

29.85

153.467

Colorado

42.69

28.07

152.084

Connecticut

42.52

28.41

149.666

Delaware

43.52

28.00

155.429

Florida

39.76

24.43

162.751

Georgia

43.34

29.04

149.242

Hawaii

44.7

30.26

147.720

Idaho

44.6

30.21

147.633
155.224

Illinois

41.6

26.8

Indiana

41.85

27.12

154.314

Iowa

44.9

29.27

153.399

Kansas

43.75

29.22

149.726

Kentucky

43.55

28.40

153.345

Louisiana

42.02

27.09

155.113

Maine

45.13

30.54

147.773

Maryland

42.72

27.96

152.790

Massachusetts

43.01

28.59

150.437

Michigan

42.28

27.68

152.746

Minnesota

44.72

29.9

149.565

Mississippi

42.78

27.98

152.895

Missouri

43.38

28.29

153.340

Montana

44.22

28.79

153.595

Nebraska

44.39

29.27

151.657

Nevada

39.76

24.43

162.751

New Hampshire

39.76

24.43

162.751

New Jersey

43.67

27.43

159.205

New Mexico

44.55

29.39

151.582

New York

43.96

29.68

148.113

North Carolina

44.98

30.15

149.187

North Dakota

43.08

27.15

158.674

Ohio

44.36

28.64

154.888

Oklahoma

43.26

29.40

147.143

Oregon

45.34

31.22

145.227

Pennsylvania

41.48

26.59

155.999

Rhode Island

45.45

28.86

157.484

South Carolina

44.11

29.66

148.719

Continued on the next page
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Table 1.1 Tax Rates on Labor Income by State (Continued)

Maximum Tax Rate1

Average Tax Rate1, 2

Tax

Wages 2002

Wages 2002

Progressivity3

South Dakota

39.76

24.43

162.751

Tennessee

39.76

24.43

162.751

Texas

39.76

24.43

162.751

Utah

43.31

29.21

148.271

Vermont

44.98

29.1

154.570

Virginia

43.34

28.79

150.538

Washington

39.76

24.43

162.751

West Virginia

43.75

28.9

151.384

Wisconsin

43.9

29.75

147.563

Wyoming

39.76

24.43

162.751

STATE

1

Tax rate = Federal tax rate + State tax rate
2
The average marginal income tax rate was calculated using a nationally representative sample of
individuals.
3
Tax Progressivity=100*Maximum Tax Rate/Average Tax Rate
Source: Feenberg, Daniel Richard, and Elizabeth Coutts, “An Introduction to the TAXSIM
Model”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management; 12(1), Winter 1993 : 189-194

Such measures taken from a single year are valid only under the
assumption that the structure of the tax system in a state relative to all other states
is constant over time such that measures of the average rate of taxation and of
progressivity from the chosen year are representative for the state system of
taxation. This appears to be the case given that the correlation between average or
maximum tax rate in any consecutive years between 1987 and 2002 ranges from
96.94% to 99.99%, with an average over these years of 99.19% for the maximum
tax level and of 99.99% for the average tax level. These numbers indicate that the
relative tax systems are stable over this period.
The regression analysis on all datasets controls for the cost of medical care
measured by the median wage by state for individuals included in the “Healthcare
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practitioners and technical occupation” group as defined by The Bureau of Labor
Statistics, for state health and hospital expenditures, for education, and for such
other individual characteristics as: gender, race, age, marital status, and urban
residence. In addition, the NLSY79 regression controls for ability as measured by
ASVAB test scores, and for parents’ health and family structure as a measure of
the initial stock of health. If the parents experienced health problems, the
probability is that the children inherited some of these genes, meaning that their
initial stock of health is lower. Family structure measured by a variable indicating
if the individual lived with both parents until he was 18 years old controls for
health accumulation in childhood. Children living with both parents have access
to more resources and potentially more parental care and, thus, have better health
outcomes [Case and Paxon, 2001].2 Summary Statistics for all variables are
available in Appendix, Table A1.
Given the availability of these measures of initial stock of health and of
ability as well as the availability of detailed data regarding past states of
2

In some unreported regressions I also control for having health insurance or not, family

size, and spouse wage income as a measure for non-labor income. The estimates on the tax
variables are not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables. The choice of not including them in
the specifications reported is explained by the desire for parsimony in the case of family size and
health insurance coverage, neither being significant in regressions. The exclusion of spouse wage
as a measure of non-labor income is due to concerns raised by the decrease in sample size and by
the correlation between spouses wage levels. This correlation would mean that the spouse wage
picks up some of the variation in the time worked by the respondent which is endogenous and,
thus, should not be included in the regression.
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residence, I choose the NLSY79 dataset for the main analysis. In the main
analysis using the NLSY79 data, the questions serving as the basis for computing
the dependent variable were asked in 1998-2002 when the individuals turned 40
years old. Given the age of the individuals in the sample, probability is that the
current state of residence is the relevant one for testing. But I also check the
results by restricting the sample to individuals who did not move between 1987
when they were 24-30 years old and 2002.
For easier interpretation, the analysis performed on NLSY79 dataset uses
the standardized physical score as dependent variable. The OLS empirical results,
reported in Table 1.2, Column 1 support the idea that the more progressive the
income tax, controlling for the tax level, the lower the amount of health chosen by
the representative individual. The higher the tax level, the poorer the health score
is. The results obtained using the sample restricted to individuals who did not
move between 1987 and 2002 (Table 1.2, Column 2) fully support the previous
results, but are of a larger magnitude, suggesting that perhaps there is selfselection into the states of residence.
Other variables show the expected sign: the higher the level of education,
the healthier people are, and the higher the ASVAB test scores the higher the
physical health score. Married people are healthier, but this is only a simple
correlation; it could be the case that healthier people have a better chance of
getting married. Women seem to be less healthy than males, seemingly
contradicting the observation that females have a longer life expectancy. This
result could reflect the fact that these scores are computed on the basis of a survey
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and was recorded by previous literature [Strauss, Gertler, Rahman, and Fox,
1993]. Maybe women are more aware of their health or perhaps women
systematically overestimate and/or men underestimate their health. Parental health
is a very important predictor of children’s health. If the parents had health
problems, their children are less healthy, indicating that parental health is a good
proxy for the initial stock of health. In addition, individuals who lived with both
of their parents until age 18 are healthier as expected since they had access to
more resources.
A source of concern is that other types of taxes may be correlated at the
same time with labor income taxes and with health. In Column 3 of Table 1.2, I
control for general sales and gross receipts tax (percent) and I find that sales taxes
do not affect the estimates. In conclusion, the exclusion of this variable does not
raise problems with the estimation.
A possible source of bias in my estimates is that state demographics may
be correlated with various characteristics of the tax system. Two such possible
sources of confound in our estimates are state age structure and income structure.
Age structure may determine the type of health care services offered in a state,
influencing the access to and the price of medical care, and, thus, affecting
individuals’ health. If age structure is correlated with the level and/or
progressivity of the income tax, then we might be observing a spurious correlation
between tax level and/or progressivity and health. In addition, if some states have
a higher proportion of high-income individuals there may be the case these states
provide a larger selection of medical services, thus influencing health. If state
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income structure is positively correlated with health, and if high-income
individuals vote for less progressive taxes, our estimates would be biased. In order
to correct the potential bias arising from omitted demographic correlates of the tax
variables I augment the specification by including in Column 4 of Table 1.2 the
proportion of population between 50 an 65 and the proportion of population 65
years and older, and in Column 5 Table 1.2 both state income and age structure.
In all these specifications the estimators are negative and significant with only
small variations in the order of magnitude.
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Table 1.2 The Effect of Labor Income Taxation on Health, NLSY79

Restricted sample a

All sample
Coeff.
Tax Progressivity
Tax Level

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

[t]

[t]

[t]

-0.019

-0.030

-0.029

-0.028

-0.036

[-2.13]

[-2.47]

[-2.73]

[-2.76]

[-2.54]

-0.063

-0.082

-0.082

-0.078

-0.104

[-2.94]

[-2.71]

[-2.86]

[-3.03]

[-3.07]

Sales Tax

[t]

Coeff.
[t]

-0.001
[-0.05]

Medical Care Cost

0.009

0.014

0.014

0.017

0.010

[0.96]

[1.42]

[1.3]

[1.8]

[0.54]

State Health and

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Hospital Expenditures

[0.6]

[0.38]

[0.38]

[0.23]

[0.45]

Education

0.036

0.040

0.040

0.040

0.041

[3.55]

[3.89]

[3.86]

[3.88]

[3.85]

ASVAB

0.003

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

[3.61]

[2.45]

[2.45]

[2.38]

[2.41]

Female

-0.131

-0.113

-0.113

-0.114

-0.112

[-4.19]

[-3.07]

[-3.07]

[-3.12]

[-3.1]

0.086

-0.004

-0.004

0.002

0.007

[1.65]

[-0.06]

[-0.07]

[0.03]

[0.1]

0.037

0.053

0.054

0.070

0.082

[0.58]

[0.67]

[0.66]

[0.79]

[0.89]

0.127

0.112

0.113

0.111

0.112

[2.96]

[2.21]

[2.21]

[2.17]

[2.16]

Black
Hispanic
If Married
Father Health

-0.207

-0.190

-0.190

-0.189

-0.197

Problem

[-7.41]

[-4.77]

[-4.79]

[-4.72]

[-4.87]

Mother Health

-0.207

-0.211

-0.211

-0.212

-0.210

Problem

[-4.87]

[-4.88]

[-4.91]

[-4.91]

[-4.84]

Both Parents until 18

0.137

0.162

0.162

0.160

0.160

[4.01]

[3.89]

[3.9]

[3.83]

[3.86]

0.022

0.045

0.045

0.048

0.048

[0.54]

[0.97]

[0.97]

[1.03]

[1.03]

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

State Age Structure

no

no

no

yes

yes

State Salaries Structure

no

no

no

no

yes

4304

2802

2802

2802

2802

Urban
Interview Year Dummies

No. Obs.
No. Clusters
R Squared

50

47

0.080

0.082

47

47

47

0.082

0.083

0.084

Health is measured by standardized SF12 physical score. Robust standard errors are corrected for
clustering by state. All calculations are weighted. a Restricted sample refers to individuals who did
not move between 1987 and 2002.
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In the light of our assumption of stable relative state tax systems, I test the
sensitivity of the estimates to changes in the date of the tax information. Table 1.3
reports the results when using tax data from the years following the Tax Reform
Act of 1993. The estimators are not significantly different from the results
obtained using the 2002 tax data. For the years preceding the 1993 tax reform, the
results are of the same sign and significance but somewhat different in magnitude,
suggesting some non-linearity.3

Table 1.3 Sensitivity Test of the Tax Impact Estimators to the Source of the Tax
Information, NLSY79
[t statistic in brackets], (t statistic Ho: ai =ai2002 in parentheses)

Tax Data

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

-0.036

-0.044

-0.039

-0.028

-0.031

[-2.84]

[-2.64]

[-2.96]

[-3.5]

(-0.52)

(-0.19)

(0.79)

(0.52)

Source
Tax Progressivity

[-2.54]

Tax Level

-0.104

-0.110

-0.104

-0.091

-0.098

[-3.07]

[-3.42]

[-3.26]

[-3.37]

[-3.88]

(-0.19)

(-0.01)

(0.50)

(0.23)

Health is measured by standardized SF12 physical score. Although the coefficients for covariates
are not reported, all regressions control for Medical Care Cost, State Health and Hospital
Expenditures, Education, ASVAB, Female, Black, Hispanic, If Married, Father Health Problem,
Mother Health Problem, Both Parents until 18, Urban, Interview Year Dummies, State Age
Structure; and State Salaries Structure. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering by state.
All calculations are weighted. The sample is restricted sample to individuals who did not move
between 1987 and 2002.

3

Log-linear specification does not change the results, nor does it seem to improve the fit.
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Another potential source of concern is that progressive taxation may
encourage specialization within household [Hunt, DeLorme, and Hill, 1981].
Progressive taxation may distort time allocation decisions because marginal tax
rates vary with family structure [Feldstein and Feenberg, 1996], and, in fact, the
labor force participation of secondary earners which have higher labor supply
elasticity [Killingsworth, 1983; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986] has been
shown to be sensitive to taxes [Triest, 1990]. In a couple one of the spouses may
prefer to concentrate on household production, which could involve more health
specific knowledge, thus influencing the health of at least one if not both of the
spouses. The inclusion of interaction terms (Table 1.4) indicates no differential
effect on married people or on women. While some studies indicate different
effects of tax provisions on men and women in a couple [Eissa and Hoynes,
2004], separate regressions for men and women (not reported) do not indicate any
differential effect on marriage either. This result suggests that the estimated effect
of progressivity on health is not driven by the influence of tax progressivity on the
specialization within the household.
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Table 1.4. The Effect of Labor Income Taxation on Health Differentiated for
Married Individuals and for Women, NLSY79

Restricted sample a
Coeff.
[t]
Tax Progressivity
Tax Level
(Tax Progressivity)*(If Married)

Coeff.
[t]

-0.037

-0.039

[-2.18]

[-2.91]

-0.104

-0.103

[-3.07]

[-3.02]

0.003
[0.25]

(Tax Progressivity)*(Female)

0.007
[0.96]

Health is measured by standardized SF12 physical score. Although the coefficients for covariates
are not reported, both regressions control for Medical Care Cost, State Health and Hospital
Expenditures, Education, ASVAB, Female, Black, Hispanic, If Married, Father Health Problem,
Mother Health Problem, Both Parents until 18, Urban, Interview Year Dummies, State Age
Structure; and State Salaries Structure. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering by state.
All calculations are weighted. a Restricted sample refers to individuals who did not move between
1987 and 2002.

As already mentioned, an alternative explanation for our results is that
there is self-selection with respect to the state of residence. In Table 1.5, I correct
for endogenous sorting into states of residence by instrumenting the tax variables
and state health expenditures variable with the property crime rate in the state, the
ratio of Democrats to Republicans in the state House, and the same ratio in the
Senate, severance taxes per capita, full-time equivalent government employment,
and the state population. The negative relation between both the level and the
progressivity of the tax and the health index remains strong and statistically
significant in this specification but the Hausman exogeneity tests can only reject
the hypothesis that the questioned variables are exogenous at 8% significance
level. The estimators obtained from the 2SLS estimation are larger than the
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estimators obtained from our main specifications Possible explanations for the
increase in the magnitude of the estimates are that some underlying characteristics
of states generate both more progressive tax systems and better health systems
delivering healthier outcomes, or that people who value health more and prefer to
spend more time for health investment instead of working choose states with more
progressive taxes in order to benefit from the lower tax rates applied for the lower
income brackets.
The F statistics in the first stage regressions, as reported in Table 1.5,
indicate that the proposed instruments are strongly correlated with the suspected
variables. Overidentification tests (Table 1.5) indicate that all variables used to
instrument the tax measures do not belong in the main equation and, thus, are
legitimate in their use as instruments.
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Table 1.5 The Effect of Labor Income Taxation on Health: 2SLS Estimation on
NLSY79

Instrumented Variables
Tax Progressivity

b

Tax Level b

All sample

Restricted sample a

Coeff.

Coeff.

[t]

[t]

-0.098

-0.102

[-2.67]

[-3.03]

-0.294

-0.278

[-2.65]

[-2.72]

State Health and

0.000

Hospital Expendituresb

[0.1]

[-0.07]

No. Obs.

4298

2800

No. Clusters

49

R squared

0.072

0.000

46
0.075

First stage F for Tax Progressivity

139.04

108.66

First stage F for Tax level

147.87

112.48

195.74

136.06

First stage F for Expenditures
Test for Overidentifying Restrictions

c

0.860

6.440

Health is measured by standardized SF12 physical score. Although the coefficients for covariates
are not reported, both regressions control for Medical Care Cost, State Health and Hospital
Expenditures, Education, ASVAB, Female, Black, Hispanic, If Married, Father Health Problem,
Mother Health Problem, Both Parents until 18, Urban, Interview Year Dummies, State Age
Structure, and State Salaries Structure.
a
Restricted sample refers to individuals who did not move between 1987 and 2002. b Tax variables
are instrumented using variables Property Crime, Dem./Rep. Ratio House, Dem./Rep. Ratio
Senate, Severance Tax, Population, and Gov. Employment. Robust standard errors are corrected
for clustering by state. All calculations are weighted. c 95% critical value is 7.81

The Magnitude of the Effect
The coefficient on our measure of progressivity indicates that, keeping the
average tax level constant, a 1 percentage point increase in the maximum rate of
taxation, thus increasing progressivity, is associated with a cumulative decrease in
health of approximately 0.36 standard deviations by the age of 40 (Table 1.6).
But an exact interpretation of the magnitude of the effect is not possible as it is
impossible to say exactly what this change means in terms of life expectancy.
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Nevertheless, the magnitude of the progressivity coefficient relative to the
coefficient on the tax level provides an indication of the importance of the impact
of progressivity on health choices (Table 1.6). The estimates suggest that
progressivity may have a more important effect on health choices than the tax
level. A 1 percentage point increase in the average rate of taxation is associated
with a cumulative decline in health of 0.28 standard deviations by the age 40,
while a 1 percentage point increase in the maximum rate of taxation, keeping the
average tax rate constant, thus increasing progressivity, is associated with a
cumulative decrease in health of approximately 0.36 standard deviations by 40
years of age.

Table 1.6 The Predicted Effect of Labor Income Taxes on Health: Interpretation

All sample

Restricted sample

Standard Deviations Change in SF12
Physical Score
1 percentage point increase in maximum tax

-0.351

-0.363

-0.294

-0.278

rate holding average tax rate constant
1 percentage point increase in the average
tax rate holding tax progressivity constant
a

Restricted sample refers to individuals who did not move between 1987 and 2002. Both
regressions control for Medical Care Cost, State Health and Hospital Expenditures, ASVAB,
Female, Black, Hispanic, If Married, Father Health Problem, Mother Health Problem, Both
Parents until 18, Urban, Interview Year Dummies, State Age Structure, and State Salaries
Structure.
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Robustness Check
I check the robustness of our results on two additional datasets, the
Current Population Survey (CPS) 2002, and the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System dataset (BRFSS) 2002. The sample retained for estimation
includes individuals 40 to 65 years old, such that there is a reasonable probability
that they resided in the observed state for a significant period. While these two
datasets do not offer the same opportunities to control for various factors that may
bias our results as NLSY79, they do provide different measures of health. When
using BRFSS, the dependent variable is expressed as the number of days of good
physical health in the month prior to the interview, and in CPS the dependent
variable is a self-reported health measure taking 5 values with a higher value
representing better health.
Given that 66% of the individuals in BRFFS reported having good
physical health for the entire month, the sample retained for estimation (Table 1.7,
Column 1) includes only individuals who had some health issues at least one day
out of the 30 possible. The estimates obtained using this sample support our
previous results. The model specification used on the CPS data (Table 1.7,
Column 2) is an Ordered Probit, and again, the results are consistent with our
previous results.
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Table 1.7 Robustness Check

Dependent variable

BRFFS

CPS All sample

CPS Restricted sample c

OLS

Ordered Probit

Ordered Probit

Number Days Good

Health Status b

Health Status b

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

[t]

[z]

[z]

Physical Health/Month a

Tax Progressivity
Tax Level
Medical Care Cost

-0.150

-0.013

-0.006

[-1.73]

[-2.22]

[-0.38]

-0.433

-0.031

-0.005

[-1.8]

[-2.14]

[-0.13]

0.249

0.028

0.043
[3.61]

[1.9]

[4.87]

State Health and

-0.002

0.000

0.000

Hospital Expenditures

[-0.7]

[-3.12]

[0.45]

High-School

4.020
[9.5]

Some College
College Degree (or >
for BRFFS dataset)

Black
Hispanic
Age
If Married

4.687

0.555

0.386

[19.78]

[6.43]

8.251

0.864

0.556

[18.26]

[28.09]

[7.13]

0.971

0.780

[27.95]

[4.78]

-0.311

-0.014

0.043

[-1.87]

[-2.04]

[1.03]

0.060

-0.261

-0.203

[0.14]

[-12.62]

[-2.82]

0.243

-0.110

-0.017
[-0.17]

[0.42]

[-6.12]

-0.172

-0.025

-0.002

[-12.93]

[-33.37]

[-0.78]

1.705

0.253

[2.86]

[16.4]

Metropolitan
Intercept

0.308
[5.14]

[11.32]

> College
Female

0.419
[17.06]

0.113
[2.23]

0.053

-0.012

[6.18]

[-0.55]

52.665
[3.06]

No. Obs.
(Pseudo) R squared

15124

65042

0.088

0.049

a

3466
0.021

Sample of individuals who experienced less than 30 days of good health in the previous month.
Health status takes values from 1 to 5, where higher value translates to better health. c Restricted
sample refers to individuals who quit job or retired for health reasons.
Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering by state. All calculations are weighted.
Sample: individuals 40 to 65 years old
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b

In addition, CPS provides us with a way to construct a falsification test. I
estimate the same model specification on a sample of individuals that quit their
job or retired for health reasons. If they are prevented from working, their health
investment should not be affected by income tax progressivity. The results
obtained from this restricted sample (Table 1.7, Column 3) suggest that this is in
fact the case: the estimates are much smaller and not statistically significant.
Introducing interaction terms of progressivity variable with age group
dummies: a 40 to 65 age group and a over 65 group in regressions on a CPS
sample of individuals over 25 years old suggest a smaller but still negative impact
of progressivity for younger people (Table 1.8). The larger negative estimated
effect of progressivity for older individuals has two sources. One is the difference
in the per period investment in health determined by changes in the shadow value
of health over time indicated by the theoretical model, and the second is the
cumulative effect over the years coming from each period investment.
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Table 1.8: The Impact of Progressivity on Health by Age Groups, CPS

CPS
Dependent variable: Health Status a
Tax Progressivity

Tax Progressivity

Tax Progressivity

interacted with Dummy

interacted with Dummy

for 39<age<66

for age>65

Coeff.

-0.010

-0.005

-0.007

[z]

[-1.74]

[-1.99]

[-1.77]

a

Health status takes values from 1 to 5, where higher value translates to better health. Although
the coefficients for covariates are not reported, the regression controls for Tax Level, Dummies for
age groups 40-65 and over 65, Medical Care Cost, State Health and Hospital Expenditures, HighSchool, Some College, College Degree, >College, Age, Female, Black, Hispanic, If Married, and
Metropolitan. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering by state. All calculations are
weighted.
Sample: individuals older that 25 (129799 observations)

However, the results from BRFSS and CPS are not reliable for measuring
the magnitude of the effect because these regressions do not control for the initial
stock of health. As an offset, it may be the case that the impact of the initial stock
of health is picked up by other variables included in the regression. As initial
stock of health determines the life expectancy, it also influences investment in
education because life expectancy limits the returns to human capital investment
[Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson, 2002]. Thus, if the initial stock of health is
positively correlated with education, then the estimated coefficients of education
will pick up some of the influence of the initial stock of health.
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Conclusions
This paper proposes that progressive taxation distorts health choices.
Using plausibly exogenous variation in state labor income tax structure, I find that
individuals who live in states with less progressive labor income taxes tend to
report healthier outcomes. While this analysis can provide only a rough
approximation of its importance, income tax progressivity appears to have a
significant effect on people’s health choices even when compared with the
estimated effect of the tax level. A 1 percentage point increase in the average rate
of taxation is associated with a cumulative decline in health of 0.28 standard
deviations by the age 40, while a 1 percentage point increase in the maximum rate
of taxation, keeping the average tax rate constant, thus increasing progressivity, is
associated with a cumulative decrease in health of approximately 0.36 standard
deviations by the age of 40.
More important than the identification of this influence are the
implications of this result. One issue is that the distortions generated by
progressive taxation are not limited to labor choices. Part of the observed health
and health expenditures differences among people may be explained by the tax
structure. Another aspect is that the estimated negative effect of progressivity is
probably exacerbated by low employment opportunities after retirement age
limiting the possibility of smoothing taxes over time. Increased labor
opportunities for individuals past the legal retirement age promote health by
increasing the reward for health investment.
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Under a progressive tax system, the marginal tax on income increases not
only with hours of work but also with hourly wage, so tax progressivity also
affects the incentives to invest in education. Since education has been proven to
be strongly correlated with health, future research should concentrate on
identifying the impact of progressivity on health mediated through education.
This aspect is also very important in terms of growth because overall,
progressivity affects growth through several channels: it affects labor incentives,
labor productivity through education, incentives to invest in health, and perhaps
the efficiency of health production through the education channel.

42

THE EFFECT OF NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES CAP ON THE DELIVERY
OF MEDICAL SERVICES

Abstract
The impact of non-economic damage caps on physicians supply was
investigated by several studies; however, its potential effect on the demand for
medical care has not been considered so far. While the reforms decrease
operational costs for physicians, they could also affect the quality assurance
offered by physicians through the willingness to bear the full cost of their medical
mistakes. Therefore, the net effect on the quantity of medical services delivered is
ambiguous. I find that the adoption of a non-economic damages cap leads to a
reduction of the number of individuals treated either inpatient or outpatient in
community hospitals, a reduction in the number of surgeries performed in
community’s hospitals, and increases the average length of stay in hospital.
JEL Classifications: I11, I12, I18, K13, K32, D00
Keywords: Malpractice, Non-Economic Damages, Patients, Medical Care
Delivered

Introduction
Health regulation has always been controversial because of the trade-off
between quantity and quality associated with most types of medical regulation.
For instance, the widely pervasive physician licensing decreases the number of

physicians but increases the average quality of medical care. The quality
guarantee provided by licensing should increase the demand for medical services,
but given that decrease in the number of physicians, the net effect on health is not
obviously positive and may in fact be negative [Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000]. As a
result, policy makers passed a series of regulations meant to encourage entry in
medical field. This paper investigates the effect of non-economic damages caps
which are meant to attract more physicians but may reduce physicians’ incentives
to provide an efficient level of care quality because of the reduced cost of medical
mistakes. If patients expect this reduction in the quality of care, the demand for
medical services decreases, potentially offsetting the positive impact of increased
supply on the quantity of medical services delivered.
The justification behind non-economic damages caps, which seems to
offset previous health regulation: physicians’ licensing, lies in the observed
increase of the price of medical care. This increase in price can potentially be
explained by the increase in premium of malpractice insurance for physicians,
attributed by some to increasing compensation amounts awarded in the
malpractice cases. As a result, many states passed or at least debated legislation
to introduce caps on malpractice damages. Moreover, President George W. Bush
proposed a nationwide $250,000 cap in medical malpractice cases, but the
proposal did not pass the Senate. Much of the existing legislation concentrates on
non-economic damages caps rather than total damages caps, the justification
being that it is hard for the juries to asses the value of non-economic losses. Thus,
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the awarded compensations for such damages should be bounded in order to offer
the juries guidance in evaluating non-economic losses.
The legislation imposing non-economic damages caps was crafted having
in mind the effect on the supply of physicians. The cap reduces damages awarded,
and thus should decrease malpractice insurance premium. This decrease in the
cost of practicing medicine will induce physicians to relocate, to delay retirement,
and in a longer term will lead to entry in the medical field. The increase in the
supply of physicians in places that adopted the cap would decrease the price of
medical care and improve access, thereby increasing the number of people that
benefit of medical care. This shift in the supply of physicians has been studied as
will be shown in the following pages, but no one so far inquired on a second
effect: a potential decrease in demand for medical services.
The novelty of this paper is that it addresses the issue of a decrease in
demand for medical care brought about by the break in the bonding between
physicians and patients. Patients find it very hard to assess the quality of medical
services before buying them and may be reluctant to buy a product of an uncertain
quality. To increase the demand for their services, physicians could offer some
quality guarantees. It may be the case that the willingness of physicians to bear
the full cost of their mistakes effectively acts as a way of bonding between the
physician and the patient, thus increasing patients’ confidence that the physician
will deliver the service of expected quality. Absent this quality assurance, the
demand for medical services will decrease and the quantity of medical care
delivered will drop below the efficient level.
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If there is a change in the demand, the observed effect in the number of
suppliers is not enough to ensure an increase in the number of medical services
delivered. This paper uses state level data between 1995 and 2004 to investigate
the impact of non-economic damage caps on the medical care services delivered
by community hospitals. I find that states that regulate the amount of noneconomic damages experience a drop in the number of patients admitted in
hospitals, number of outpatient visits and number of surgeries performed, and
potentially an increase in the average length of hospitalization in community
hospitals.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. In section 2.2, I present the
theoretical framework that explains the effect of non-economic damages caps on
the quantity of medical care services delivered; in section 2.3, I present the
empirical strategy used to investigate the questioned effect; in section 2.4, I
present the empirical results, and in section 2.5 the conclusions.

The Effect of Medical Malpractice Reforms
The Impact on the Number of Physicians
If non-economic damage caps are binding and reduce awarded damages,
the prediction is that malpractice insurance premiums decrease, triggering a drop
in the cost of practicing medicine and leading to entry in the medical field. As the
supply of physicians increases, everything else held constant the price of medical
care decreases, access to medical services improves, resulting in a larger number
of people that benefit of medical care.
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Hence the increase in the supply of physicians depends on whether
insurance companies will pass some of the gains from reduced damage payments
on their customers, the physicians. The opponents of caps, lawyers in particular,
claim that there is no evidence that caps will have any influence on insurance
rates. Baicker and Chandra [2004] find that increases in malpractice payments do
not result in an increase in premiums, supporting lawyers’ hypothesis. On the
other hand, other studies indicate that may not be the case. Sloan, Mergenhagen,
and Bovbjerg [1989] using closed claims data from National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) find that non-economic damage caps reduced
insurer payouts. Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan [1990] results from perphysician premium data from the Health Care Financing Administration survey of
insurers indicate that caps decreased the average indemnity per claim. More
recently Thorpe [2004] used state specific NAIC data from 1985-2001 to
conclude that premiums are lower in states that regulated the amount of noneconomic damages. Over a similar period of time, 1994-2003, Danzon et. al.
[2004] find significant reductions in premium increases in states that adopted caps
on awards for non-economic damages at or below $500,000. Also Viscusi and
Born [2005] study reports that in 1984-1991 insurers from states with caps on
non-economic damages had 17% lower losses and 6% lower earned premiums.
All these studies suggest that caps lead to lower losses for the insurance
companies and that part of this gain is passed to their customers, the physicians, in
the form of lower premium rates. Moreover, there is evidence that non-monetary
costs are also reduced. Analyzing data from the American Medical Association
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Socioeconomic Monitoring System ("AMA SMS") survey, Kessler and
McClellan [1997] find that general reforms also reduce the probability that a
physician will be sued and Browne and Puelz [1999] suggest that non-economic
damages caps lead to a significant reduction in the number of court cases filed.
The available data point toward a reduction in the costs born by physicians
in the states that introduced the reform. If that is the case, there should be entry in
this field. Several studies suggest that this is indeed the case. Klick and Stratmann
[2005] find that there are more doctors in states that have a cap.4 Encinosa and
Hellinger [2005] analyze 1985-2000 data and conclude that caps increase the
supply of doctors. Kessler, Sage, and Becker [2005] study also provides support
toward an increase in physicians supply caused by tort reforms.
The Impact on the Demand for Medical Services
The market for medical care services is characterized by asymmetric
information. Physicians know more about their abilities than patients and the
quality of the product cannot be assessed ex-ante by the patients. Patients may be
reluctant to buy a product of an uncertain quality, resulting in an inefficiently low
quantity of medical care consumed.
The solution for the asymmetric information problem is equal information,
and sometimes the government can intervene to alleviate the problem.
Governments in all states introduced licensing requirements like minimum
4

Their estimates are strongly significant, but they obtain an unexpected result when

analyzing the effect of the amount of the cap. The $500,000 cap leads to a significant change in
the number of doctors, while a tighter restriction, a $250,000 cap has no significant effect.
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knowledge in the field as proved by tests (United States Medical Licensing
Examination, USMLE). Minimum proved expertise should be able to offer some
information about medical care quality and remove any possibility of a “market
for lemons” [Ackerlof, 1970] in medical care. But this measure does not yet lead
to an efficient way of assessing true quality; there remains enough variation
between physicians having at least the minimum level of competence.
Absent perfect information, the demand for medical care reflects patients’
expectation about the quality of the service and is lower than the efficient level.
Thus there are still unexhausted gains from eliminating asymmetric information.
If patients could assess quality, they would be willing to pay more for better
quality, providing incentives for physicians to supply it. Patients gain from
improved access to higher quality services, and physicians are rewarded for
increased effort. Whether the patients should try to obtain the information or the
physicians should try to convey the information is a question that hinges on the
relative costs. Some data like the number of physicians and dentists, 74,1485,
serving the 35,086,0616 patients admitted in US’s community hospitals in 2004
suggest that it is efficient for the physicians to undertake this task.
Part of the problem is solved by reputation: as some physicians prove that
they deliver high quality service, the demand for their services will increase. But
building this reputation requires that the doctor has the incentives to commit to
provide the high quality product in the first place. If for instance the insurance

5

AHA Hospitals Statistics, 2006

6

AHA Hospitals Statistics, 2006
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premiums do not adjust for past experience, as it is in fact the case [Sloan, 1990],
these incentives will be diminished.
Another way to convey the information to the consumers is to provide a
credible guarantee that the service provided has the promised quality [Grossman,
1980]. This guarantee has value only if the seller can be constrained to honor his
promise in case of failure to deliver. In this case, sellers that do not provide the
guarantee will find themselves facing a lower demand for their services. I propose
that caps on non-economic damages act as a signal that physicians are not willing
to and will choose not to bear the costs of their failure of providing a certain level
of quality. Even if the physician continues to buy insurance and even if the
premiums do not decrease with the regulation, damage caps effectively signal that
the quality guarantee may not be honored. In this case demand for medical
services or at least for a part of medical services will decrease. This decrease
depends on how responsive is the demand to this signal and on patients’
expectations.
Predicted Effect of Caps on Medical Care Delivered
Non-economic damage caps lower operation costs for doctors leading to
entry in the medical field. The prediction is that more physicians lead to lower
transportation costs and lower price of medical services, which, everything else
held constant, induces an increase in the quantity of care delivered.
The reform may also affect the quality guarantee offered by the
physicians’ willingness to bear the full cost of potential mistakes, thus decreasing
the demand for medical services. As a consequence the overall effect of the caps
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on the equilibrium quantity of medical services actually delivered is ambiguous. If
the effect is positive then the reform at least partially attained its purpose, but if
the effect is negative we may want to reconsider the method used so far to
improve medical care delivery.
Changes in the amount of medical care delivered have effects on the
health of the population. As economic theory points out, the demand for medical
care is a result of the demand for health. Individuals use medical care and their
own time to produce health [Grossman, 1972]. As regulation affects the amount
of medical care, it may also change health outcomes in the same direction. But
Kessler and McClellan [1996] find no significant effect on mortality or medical
complications even though malpractice reforms reduce hospital expenditures. The
cost difference, they say, may be explained by defensive medicine. Potential
losses from malpractice liability, argue the authors, create incentives for
physicians to practice “defensive medicine,” by ordering additional procedures
than they would otherwise in order to reduce involvement in litigations. Klick and
Stratmann [2005] on the other hand indicate that caps on non-economic damages
reduce black infant mortality rate. The difference between the white and black
infant mortality rate is explained by disproportionate improvement in access to
medical care for the two categories. As the number of physicians grows, they
locate in regions lacking a provider at that point in time. Their result is consistent
with an expected low elasticity of demand for prenatal care with respect to
changes in quality guarantee. On the other hand, Currie and Macleod [2006] argue
that physicians may be more likely to perform unnecessary procedures when they
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are less fearful of liability, leading to maternal complications. They find some
empirical support for their theory: non-economic damage caps increase the
number of C-sections and the number of complications of labor. Nevertheless and
alternative explanation for their result is that caps reduce people’s trust in
physicians. The perceived reduced benefit from medical assistance may lead to
less preventive visits to the doctor, and to worsening outcomes, requiring more
procedures. In general the lack of definitive evidence with respect to health
outcomes is consistent with the existence of a time lag necessary to observe the
effects and of defensive medicine practices.

Data and Empirical Strategy
This study uses state level data between 1995 and 2004 to investigate the
effect of non-economic damages caps on the quantity of medical services
delivered by community hospitals. I measure the quantity of medical services
delivered by the percent of state population treated either inpatient or outpatient in
community hospitals, the percent of state population having surgeries, and the
average length of stay in community hospitals.
During this period fourteen states changed their existing law (reported in
Table 2.1) either by introducing or by removing the cap, opening the opportunity
of using this panel data to perform a difference-in-difference analysis that uses the
state reforms of the non-economic cap regulation as exogenous shocks. This
method identifies the effect of changes in laws on the various measures of
medical care delivered for every state.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Legislation on Non-Economic Damages Caps: 1995-2004

States with Caps for the Entire Period

AK, CA, CO, HI, ID, KS, LA, MD, MA, MI,
MO, MT, ND, VA, WV

States without Caps for the Entire Period

AL, AZ, AR, CT, DE, GA, IA, KY, ME, MN,
NH, NJ, NY, NC, OK, PA, RI, SC, TN, VT,
WA, WY

States that Introduced Caps in this Period

FL (2003), IN(1998), MS(2002), NV(2002),
NM(1996), OH(2003), OK(2004),
SD(1997), TX(2003), UT(1996), WI(1997)

States that Repealed Caps during this Period

IL (1997), OH(1999), OR(1999)

Source: American Tort Reform Association (http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7340);
McCullough, Campbell, Lane, “Summary of Medical Malpractice Law,”
(http://www.mcandl.com/states.html)

I measure the impact of the law by introducing a dummy variable
indicating the state has a cap on non-economic damages in a given year regardless
of the value of the cap. This study also controls for a variety of factors that may
explain why some states deliver more medical services. Among these factors are
demographic characteristics like the percent of population 65 years old or older,
percent blacks, percent population that graduated high-school, personal income
per capita, and percent individuals not covered by medical insurance. An older
population may imply a higher demand for medical care. The variables reflecting
the racial structure of the population control for possible systematic differences in
demands from different segments of the population. A better educated population
could make a difference in a number of ways: it could mean a higher demand for
medical care; it could mean more prevention, thus a shorter average stay in
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hospitals; it could also mean faster or more significant reactions to changes in
legislation.
Further, state health and hospital expenditures influence the demand for
health. Because the state provides coverage to certain low-income or
disadvantaged population groups, the demand for medical care increases. It may
be also the case that individuals with frail health prefer to locate in states that
already spend more on health, because a high demand for these services makes it
more likely for the state to provide a larger range of health services and to have
more health facilities, and thus to have lower costs of access to care. If health
infrastructure is correlated not only with state health expenditures but also with
non-economic damages caps because there are more doctors to lobby for the caps,
the obtained estimator for the regulation will be biased. To control for this
possibility a measure of state health and hospital expenditures is also included in
regressions.
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Obs.

Non-Economic Damages

500

Mean

Std. Dev.

0.430

0.496

Cap

Source
American Tort Reform Association 1;
McCullough, Campbell, Lane,
“Summary of Medical Malpractice
Law” 2

Outcomes of Interests
Patients Admitted

500

11.604

2.040

AHA Hospital Statistics 2000-2006

500

189.241

52.145

AHA Hospital Statistics 2000-2006

500

152.139

49.600

AHA Hospital Statistics 2000-2006

500

37.102

7.778

AHA Hospital Statistics 2000-2006

500

9.510

2.023

AHA Hospital Statistics 2000-2006

Average Length of Stay

500

6.243

1.438

AHA Hospital Statistics 2000-2006

Month Prenatal Care Began:

198

81.873

4.657

(per 100 pers.)
Total Outpatient Visits
(per 100 pers.)
Outpatient Visits other than
Emergency (per 100 pers.)
Outpatient Visits
Emergency (per 100 pers.)
Surgeries Performed
(per 100 pers.)

1st-3rd month
Month Prenatal Care Began:

198

12.556

2.876

4th-6th month
Month Prenatal Care Began:

Center of Disease Control and
Prevention

198

2.567

0.964

7th-9th month
No Prenatal Care

Center of Disease Control and
Prevention

Center of Disease Control and
Prevention

198

0.923

0.574

Center of Disease Control and

500

4.646

7.706

Census: State Government Finances

>=65 years old (per 100 pers.)

500

12.611

1.898

Statistical Abstract of the

High-School

500

84.640

4.338

U.S. Census Bureau, Current

500

24.651

4.666

Percent Black

500

10.176

9.520

U.S. Census Bureau, Population

Percent Hispanic

500

7.421

8.748

U.S. Census Bureau, Population

Control Variables
State Health and Hospital Exp.

Prevention

(per capita, share of income)
United States
(per 100 pers.)
Bachelor

Population Survey

(per 100 pers.)

U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Population Survey
Division

Percent Uninsured

500

10.385

12.117

Division
U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Population
Survey, (1988 to 2005 Annual Social
and Economic Supplements)

Personal Income per

500

11.464

7.766

Regional Economic Information

Capita (CPI adjusted)

System, Bureau of Economic Analysis,

(in thousands)

U.S. Department of Commerce

Continued on the next page
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics (continues)

Variable

Obs.

Population

500

Mean

Std. Dev.

554.614

607.439

(in thousands)
Immigrants

Source
U.S. Census Bureau, Population
Division

500

198.058

160.956

500

10.045

16.592

Yearbook of Immigration Statistics

(per 1000 pers.)
Sales Tax Receipts
(per capita, income share)
Fatalities from Vehicle Accidents

U.S. Census Bureau, State
Government Tax Collections

500

17.091

6.044

Fatality Analysis Reporting System

500

12.623

5.741

Hirsh et. al, 2005

497

31.270

21.881

Current Population Survey

Lawyers (per 100 pers.)

346

0.148

0.046

Bureau of Labor Statistics

Catholics (per 100 pers.)

350

18.511

12.642

(per 100000 pers.)
Union
(per 100 employees)
Percent Non-metropolitan
Instruments

1

The Official Catholic Directory ‘98-‘04

http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7340; 2 http://www.mcandl.com/states.html

Economic theory predicts that non-economic damage caps lead to an
increase in the number of physicians in the states that adopted a cap. Changes in
the number of doctors definitely affect the amount of care delivered, but since
from a policy point of view the relevant question is whether, everything
considered, a non-economic damage cap is able to improve the delivery of
medical care in population, I do not include the number of physicians and the
number of hospitals in the state in the regressions because these variable would be
endogenous in this setting. Consequently, I estimate the net effect of this
regulation a measure for the effectiveness of non-economic damage caps.
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In addition state and fixed effects are included. All regressions are
estimated using population weights. The model specification is:

Qmsit = O + R1 * Capit + R2 * Xit + `i + Xt + ait,

Here Qms is the quantity of medical services; Cap is a dummy equal to 1 if there
is a non-economic damages cap in effect in a state in a particular year and R1 is the
coefficient of interest; i represents the state; t is time; X is a vector of covariates;
`i and Xt represent state and year fixed effects; R2 is the matrix of coefficients on
the covariates; R3 is the coefficient on the time trend, which is included in some
specifications.
Direct estimation of the impact of the law on the quantity of medical care
is not appropriate if the law was passed because of a presumed inefficient level of
medical care delivered to the population. Faced with the discontent caused by
poor access to medical care, the government introduces regulation predicted to
reduce the cost of medical services. If that is the case, all measures of the quantity
of medical care are negatively correlated with the passage of the law. Or it may be
the case that physicians lobbied for measures decreasing their operating costs, in
which case the quantity of care could be positively correlated with the passage of
the law, because in states with higher demand for medical care, physicians would
have more resources for lobbying and would be more likely to attain their
objective. To control for this hypothesis we instrument the existence of the non-
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economic damages cap in a state with the percent of lawyers in the state
population and with the percent Catholics in population.
The intuition behind using the number of lawyers as an instrument is that
lawyers are one of the parties that have interests in this type of legislation. As
Olson [1965] noted, groups that have some advantage in organizing for collective
action are more successful in influencing the legislative process. Lawyers not only
are relatively easy to organize but also have significant individual stakes in
increasing the quantity of litigation and the size of the damages awarded. Noneconomic damages caps reduce the incentives to sue physicians for malpractice
because the benefits from suing decrease under the law, creating strong incentives
for lawyers to openly take position against tort reform7. More lawyers could be
indicative for higher lobbying power, in which case I expect a lower probability
of passing a law in states with more lawyers. The negative correlation between
lawyers and regulation should be especially strong given that states that have
more lawyers are expected to have more lawyer-legislators supporting the same
interests. As McCormick and Tollison [1981] explain, lawyers find it more
7

A couple of examples are given by: Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers: “Caps

Reward Bad Doctors and Punish Injured Consumers” in “10 Reasons Noneconomic Damage Caps
Are Unfair” at <http://www.watl.org/10%20reasons%20caps.pdf#search=%22noneconomic%20damage%20cap%22>; The Ohio Academy for Trial Lawyers: “Malpractice
insurance rates aren’t driving doctors out of Ohio, as the number of doctors in Ohio has remained
steady. Insurance companies are making record profits. States with more stringent legal reforms
have no better business climate or malpractice rates for doctors than those that don’t. “
<http://www.oatlaw.org/OH/index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=InsuranceReformFacts>

58

advantageous to get involved in the political process than other professions;
making this profession the best represented profession in the legislature. This
advantage is explained by the fact that when these legislators-lawyers return to
their practice after service in the legislature they are capable of capturing the
gains from the legislation they supported. Thus the more lawyers-legislators, the
lower the probability that the state adopts non-economic damages caps. This
predicted strong correlation between the number of lawyers and regulation
indicates that the number of lawyers meets the first condition for a good
instrument. In addition, given that I control for the level of per capita income in a
state, the number of lawyers is not expected to be correlated with the quantity of
medical care delivered, thus meeting the second necessary condition for a good
instrument.
Catholics are another group that took position in the issue of tort reforms.
Catholic groups and leaders, concerned about illegitimate malpractice claims,
expressed support for tort reforms in general and non-economic damages caps in
particular8. Given their openly expressed support, I expect that the part of
8

Some examples of Catholic leaders and organizations that expressed their support for

tort reform include: West-Virginia Catholic Conference: “We call for policies that: […]Maintain
tort reform legislation passed in 2003 to maintain a degree of protection to physicians, hospitals,
care givers, charities and other health care providers” at

<http://www.dwc.org/chancery/wvcc/health.shtml>; Sister Jomary Trstensky about medical care
system in Wisconsin: ” Unless a cap is reinstated on non-economic damages, Wisconsin will
experience what Illinois has endured…access to care will suffer.” at
<http://www.wha.org/newsCenter/pdf/ nr10-27-05sb393.pdf>; “Pennsylvania Catholic Conference
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population that follows their leadership also support such legislation and thus the
larger the share of Catholics in population the higher the probability that the state
adopted non-economic damages caps. In addition it is not obvious that religious
beliefs should have any impact on the quantity of medical services demanded,
making the proportion of Catholics in population a good instrument for caps.
The model specification used is a treatment effects model as described by
Maddala [1983, pp. 117-122]:

Qmsit = O + R1 Capit + R2 Xit + `i + Xt + ait,
Capit = S + e * Wit + uit

where W is a vector of exogenous instruments: percent lawyers and percent
Catholics in the state population; S is vectors of coefficients on intercept, and e is
the matrix of coefficients on instruments.

supports the following legislation […] HB 139 Limits non-economic damages in medical liability
cases to $250,000,” where HB= House Bill.
<http://www.pacatholic.org/newsletter/Spring%202004%20Viewpoint.pdf#search=%22%20Catho
lic%20Health%20%20on%20non-economic%20damages%22> ; Washington State Catholic
Conference is a member of the Liability Reform Coalition that lists among its goals “to limit the
expansion of tort liability,” <http://www.walrc.org/about/members.html>

60

Results
Panel data analysis, reported in Table 2.3, indicates that caps on noneconomic damages have a negative effect on the number of patients admitted in
community hospitals, the number of outpatient visits, and on the number of
surgeries performed, but are associated with a longer average length of
hospitalization. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that, when a cap
is in place, people perceive medical care as riskier and prolong their period of
search for the right physician. But a longer period of search comes at the cost of
potential health worsening. If people delay seeing a doctor, the probability that a
disease is detected in early stages decreases, making necessary a longer period of
hospitalization.
The covariates have the expected signs. States with a higher percentage of
individuals over 65 years old have a higher demand for medical services. Income
per capita is negatively correlated with the number of patients treated in
community hospitals consistent with the already observed regularity that income
is positively correlated with health. While we should expect that higher income is
associated with higher demand for preventive services, the same would not hold
for the type of services provided by hospitals if income is positively correlated
with health. Education, as measured by the percent of population that graduated
high-school is negatively correlated with the average length of hospitalization,
reflecting the fact that better educated individuals tend to enjoy better health and,
thus, need less time to recover. My estimates also indicate in that states with a
higher percentage of African-Americans more individuals are being treated
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outpatient, and the average length of hospitalization is shorter. Having a higher
proportion of uninsured population is positively correlated with a higher incidence
of surgeries performed, an indication that a higher part of the population relies
exclusively on emergency care.

Table 2.3: The Effect of Non-Economic Damages Cap on the Delivery of Medical
Care [t statistic in brackets]

Non-Economic Damage Cap
State Health and Hospital Exp.
Percent 65+
Income
High-School
Percent Black
Percent Uninsured

Patients

Total Outpatient

Surgeries

Average Length

Admitted

Visits

Performed

of Stay

-0.192

-4.570

-0.138

0.092

[-3.34]

[-2.49]

[-1.48]

[2.78]

0.010

-0.215

-0.010

-0.002

[1.4]

[-0.79]

[-0.91]

[-0.43]

-0.127

18.152

0.411

-0.006
[-0.12]

[-1.4]

[6.37]

[3.23]

-0.074

-0.142

-0.007

-0.013

[-4.64]

[-0.21]

[-0.32]

[-0.75]

-0.006

1.140

0.024

-0.023

[-0.39]

[1.95]

[1.08]

[-2.21]

0.069

9.123

0.041

-0.222

[0.96]

[3.01]

[0.38]

[-3.54]

0.001

-0.031

0.001

0.000

[1.65]

[-1.65]

[2.73]

[1.19]

State FE

yes

yes

yes

yes

Year FE

yes

yes

yes

yes

No. obs.

500

500

500

500

Sample

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

0.977

0.949

0.928

0.958

R squared

Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.

A sensitivity check of the results is performed and some of the results
reported in Table 2.4. The baseline results are compared first with the results
obtained after excluding Ohio, the state that first repealed the cap and than
adopted it again during the period analyzed. In the third row of results I exclude
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the state with the lowest amount of medical care delivered from each
specification: Alaska in the case of percent patients admitted and surgeries
performed in community hospitals, Nevada in the case of percent outpatient visits,
and New Mexico in the case of the average length of stay. Then the highest
amount of care delivered state is excluded: District of Columbia in the case of
percent patients admitted and surgeries performed in community hospitals,
Vermont in the case of percent outpatient visits, and Montana in the case of the
average length of stay. In all cases, the results are comparable with the results
obtained from the baseline specification. Even when controlling for
geographically correlated factors by augmenting the baseline specification with
region-year interactions, the results are remain comparable but somewhat smaller
with the exception of the surgeries performed specification. This last result is an
indication that there are some unobserved factors, not controlled for in the
baseline specification, whose influence is picked-up by the region-year
interactions.
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Table 2.4 Sensitivity Check of Non-Economic Damages Cap Coefficient to
Alternative Specifications [t statistic in brackets]

Baseline

Omit Ohio

Patients

Total Outpatient

Surgeries

Average Length

Admitted

Visits

Performed

of Stay

-0.192

-4.570

-0.138

0.092

[-3.34]

[-2.49]

[-1.48]

[2.78]

-0.185

-6.267

-0.138

0.111

[-2.92]

[-3.39]

[-1.4]

[3.12]

Omit High Demand

-0.192

-4.504

-0.138

0.093

State

[-3.34]

[-2.43]

[-1.48]

[2.82]

Omit Low Demand

-0.194

-4.403

-0.140

0.092

State(s)

[-3.36]

[-2.36]

[-1.49]

[2.71]

Region-Year

-0.175

-3.685

-0.231

0.061

Interactions

[-3.2]

[-1.72]

[-2.14]

[1.6]

Sample

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

Although the coefficients for covariates are not reported, all regressions control for State Health
and Percent 65+, Income, High-school, Percent Black, Percent Uninsured, and State and Time FE.
Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.

Another concern is raised by the possibility that the non-economic
damages caps have effects across the border. While it is relatively costly for
physicians to move from one state to another due to different licensing
requirements, a large enough drop in the cost of practice could induce some of the
physicians to move their practice from a state without a cap to a state that as
adopted the cap. I explore this possibility by introducing a dummy variable
indicating whether the state is bordering at least one other state that adopted the
cap. The results reported in Table 2.5 indicate that this is not a problem for the
sample investigated, and that at least in a relatively short term of 10 years most of
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the increase in the number of physicians recorded by previous literature as being
associated with the introduction of the cap does not come from movement across
the border but rather from delayed retirement.

Table 2.5 The Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps Adopted by Bordering
States [t statistic in brackets]

Patients

Total Outpatient

Surgeries

Average Length

Admitted

Visits

Performed

of Stay

Non-Economic

-0.206

-4.615

-0.147

0.091

Damage Cap

[-3.6]

[-2.54]

[-1.56]

[2.77]

Border States Cap

Sample

-0.175

-0.563

-0.108

-0.013

[-1.93]

[-0.15]

[-0.88]

[-0.17]

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

Although the coefficients for covariates are not reported, all regressions control for State Health
and Percent 65+, Income, High-school, Percent Black, Percent Uninsured, and State and Time FE.
Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.

The results reported in Table 2.5 also suggest that, at least for the 10 years
period investigated, there is no bias in my baseline estimated due to physicians’
mobility across border. But the estimates may still be underestimating the total
effect of the regulation if there are cumulative effects from having the cap in place
for several years. In Table 2.6, I control for the number of years passed since the
cap was introduced, and find that there is no cumulative effect on the patients
treated or surgeries performed but there is a significant cumulative effect on
average length of hospitalization. This result is consistent with the hypothesis
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advanced previously of an increase in the search time coming at the later cost of
health deterioration.

Table 2.6 The Instantaneous and the Cumulative Impact of Non-Economic
Damages Cap [t statistic in brackets]

Patients

Total Outpatient

Surgeries

Average Length

Admitted

Visits

Performed

of Stay

Non-Economic Damage

-0.218

-4.590

-0.098

0.029

Cap - Instantaneous Effect

[-3.28]

[-1.89]

[-0.92]

[0.72]

Non-Economic Damage

0.011

0.009

-0.017

0.026

Cap - Cumulative Effect

[1.22]

[0.02]

[-0.97]

[2.78]

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

1995-2004

Sample

Although the coefficients for covariates are not reported, all regressions control for State Health
and Percent 65+, Income, High-school, Percent Black, Percent Uninsured, and State and Time FE.
Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.

As I mentioned, some of these measures of medical care delivery are
probably related. For instance, if people go more often to the doctor and the
marginal individual is healthier, the average length of hospitalization drops. The
same relation holds between the number of surgeries performed and the average
length of stay. Consequently, I estimate the patients admitted and the average
length of stay equations simultaneously using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated
regressions approach. Then I do the same thing for surgeries performed and the
average length of stay. The results are reported in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7 The Effect of Non-Economic Damages Cap on the Delivery of Medical
Care: Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression

Coefficient on Non-Economic Damages Cap
Patients Admitted

Average Length of Stay

Coeff

-0.191

0.085

[t statistic]

[-3.6]

[2.08]

Test of Independent Equations
Chi square
[P value]

4.480
[0.034]
Coefficient on Non-Economic Damages Cap
Surgeries Performed

Average Length of Stay

Coeff

-0.141

0.086

[t statistic]

[-1.46]

[2.13]

Test of Independent Equations
Chi square

11.582

[P value]

[0.001]

Although the coefficients for covariates are not reported, all regressions control for State Health
and Percent 65+, Income, High-school, Percent Black, Percent Uninsured, and State and Time FE.
In addition, I control for Percent Hispanics in the “Patients Admitted” regression, for Sales Tax
Receipts in the “Average Length of Stay” regression, and for Percent Immigrants in the “Surgeries
Performed” regression. Regressions weighted by population. Small-sample adjustments are used
for computing the covariance matrix of the residuals.

I control for Percent Hispanics in the “Patients Admitted” regression, for
Sales Tax Receipts in the “Average Length of Stay” regression, and for Percent
Immigrants in the “Surgeries Performed” regression. Given the sample size, I
make small-sample adjustments for computing the covariance matrix of the
residuals. While the coefficients on the caps become even more significant in the
equations for patients admitted and for surgeries performed, the t statistic on the
estimated effect of caps on the length of hospitalization drops somewhat. This
result indicates that at least part of the observed positive effect on the average
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length of hospitalization is caused by the observed drop in the number of patients
admitted in community hospitals and in the number of surgeries.
Replicating the analysis reported in Table 2.3 using logs of the dependent
variables indicates that states that choose to introduce a cap experience a decrease
of 1.5% in the percent of population admitted in community hospital, of 1.7 % in
the percent outpatient visits, of 1.3% in the percent surgeries performed in
population, and a 1.7% increase in the average length of stay, the equivalent of
0.09 days. One explanation for this difference is that the cap is not equally
binding for across types of medical services. Another plausible explanation is that
people are more likely to increase their search period when it is less costly in
terms of health worsening, for preventive or exploratory services for instance.
This last theory implies that caps should have the smallest negative effect on
types of medical care that are hard / expensive to delay acquiring. I test this
prediction by splitting the total number of outpatient visits between emergency
outpatient visits and all other outpatient visits and estimate the effect of caps on
these variables simultaneously. I control for fatalities from vehicle accidents in
the emergency outpatient visits regression, and for percent of population living in
non-metropolitan area in the all other outpatient visits regression because people
living far from a hospital are less likely to choose outpatient treatment than those
living close if transportation cost are high. Table 2.8 results from the Zellner’s
seemingly unrelated regressions estimation indicates that indeed, non-economic
damage caps have a strongly significant and relatively large effect on outpatient
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visits other than emergency, but no significant effect on emergency visits,
providing support for the above argument.

Table 2.8 The Effect of Non-Economic Damages Cap on Emergency Care

Coefficient on Non-Economic Damage Cap
[1]

[2]

Outpatient Visits

Outpatient Visits

other than Emergency

Emergency

Coeff

-5.470

0.358

[t statistic]

[-2.43]

[1.35]

Test of Independent Equations
Chi square

14.379

[P value]

[0.000]

Ho: Coeff [1] =Coeff [2]
F

6.870

[P value]

[0.01]

Although the coefficients for covariates are not reported, all regressions control for State Health
and Percent 65+, Income, High-school, Percent Black, Percent Uninsured, and State and Time FE.
In addition, I control for Fatalities from Vehicle Accidents in the “Outpatient Visits Emergency”
regression and for Percent Non-metropolitan in the “Outpatient Visits other than Emergency”
regression. Regressions weighted by population. Small-sample adjustments are used for
computing the covariance matrix of the residuals. Sample size: 497 observations.

The alternative explanation for our estimates would be that the law was
passed in states with low level of medical care delivered to the population. We
test this hypothesis by instrumenting the existence of regulation in a state with the
percent of lawyers in the state population and with the percent catholic in
population. Both instruments are strongly correlated with the non-economic
damages cap regulation, as seen in Table 2.9. A Wald test for independence
indicates that treatment regression is the appropriate estimation method in the
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case of surgeries performed. The test cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no
bias in the direct estimations of the impact of non-economic damages cap on
patients admitted, outpatient visits and average length of stay in community
hospitals.

Table 2.9 The Effect of Non-Economic Damages Cap - Treatment Effects Model
[t statistic in brackets]

Patients

Total Outpatient

Surgeries

Average Length

Admitted

Visits

Performed

of Stay

Non-Economic

-0.384

-12.276

-1.151

0.096

Damage Cap

[-1.1]

[-2.19]

[-6.06]

[1.99]

First stage
Lawyers

-6.896
[-2.79]

Catholics

0.021
[2.04]

No. Obs.
Chi square

346
7.82

Test of Independence

0.25

1.86

16.75

2.93

[P value]

[0.618]

[0.172]

[0]

[0.087]

Although the coefficients for covariates are not reported, all regressions control for State Health
and Percent 65+, Income, High-school, Percent Black, Percent Uninsured, and State and Time FE.
Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.

The estimated coefficient on the reform dummy from the treatment effects
estimation increases in magnitude while keeping the significance and the same
sign indicated by the fixed effects estimation. These results suggest that the
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legislation was passed in states where more surgeries were performed and perhaps
as a result more lawsuits were filed. The cap is not as binding for other
specializations and that is why the law is exogenous in the other regressions. But
this is also an indication that the impact of the regulation varies across types of
medical services because the cap is only binding for certain specializations. Due
to the specific of their specialization, the surgeons and the obstetrician are
expected to experience the largest decrease in the cost of their malpractice
insurance once the cap is introduced. Previous results indicate that while surgeries
are one of the fields with the largest expected increase in supply, the net effect of
non-economic damages caps is nevertheless still negative. But it is worth looking
at the amount of obstetric services too, as the second field where the increase in
supply may be able to offset the postulated decrease in demand, such that the cap
actually achieves its purpose.
Using data from the Center of Disease Control and Prevention between
2000 and 2003, I investigate the influence of non-economic damages cap on the
amount of prenatal care services delivered as measured by the percent of
expecting mothers starting to receive prenatal care in the first, second, third
trimester, or receiving no prenatal care. Since these measures are related I
estimate all 4 equations simultaneously using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated
regressions approach. In addition to the previous controls, I include the percent of
people holding a bachelors degree in the first equation because more educated
women are more likely to present themselves to the doctor early; the rate of
unionization in the state in the second equation because unions may be able to
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negotiate better terms on the insurance contracts and increase the likelihood that
women are covered, thus increasing the demand for prenatal care; sales tax
receipts per capita as a share of income per capita as a measure of redistribution in
the third equation; and the percent new immigrants in the last regression because
new immigrants are the one the are most likely not to ask for any prenatal care.
The results reported in Table 2.10 indicate that even though these are preventive
visits, thus more likely perceived as cheap in terms of health worsening and more
likely to experience a significant drop in demand, the introduction of a noneconomic damages cap leads to an increase in the proportion of mothers that start
receiving care in their first trimester and to a reduction in the proportion of
mothers that receive no care. The result is consistent with a shift in supply large
enough to offset any drop in demand caused by a longer search period.

Table 2.10 The Impact of Non-Economic Damages Cap on Prenatal Care

Coefficient on Non-Economic Damage Cap
Dependent Variable

Month Prenatal Care Began
1st-3rd month

4th-6th month

7th-9th month

No Prenatal
Care

Coeff

0.944

-0.237

-0.020

-0.285

[t statistic]

[3.15]

[-1.18]

[-0.26]

[-4.77]

Test of Independent Equations
Chi square
[P value]

130.327
[0]

Although the coefficients for covariates are not reported, all regressions control for State Health
and Percent 65+, Income, High-school, Percent Black, Percent Uninsured, and State and Time FE.
Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.
Sample 2000-2003.
Sample size: 198 observations
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If caps lead to a decrease in demand, the result obtained in the case of
prenatal care services would not be true for most other preventive visits, because
the cap would not be binding for many other physicians’ specialties and the
supply would not increase. I test this hypothesis using the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS) data from 1996 to 2002. This dataset provides a
measure of the amount of preventive medical services consumed by a person as
described by how long has it been since the individual last visited a doctor for a
routine checkup. This variable takes a value of 1 if the last check-up visit took
place within the past year, a value of 2 if within the past 2 years, a value of 5 if
within the past 5 years, and a value of 4 if the last visit took place 5 or more years
before the interview. As a result I estimate an ordered probit with state and time
fixed effects that controls for age, gender, race, marital status, number of children,
education, income, health status, whether the individual has any type of health
insurance, and whether the state of residence has adopted a cap on non-economic
damages. The health status variable controls for an increased demand for care
derived from a poorer general health even in absence of a health shock, and the
health plan variable accounts for the moral hazard generated by the existence of
the insurance. Summary statistics for these variables are reported below in Table
2.11.
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Table 2.11 Summary Statistics – BRFSS Sample

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Non-Economic Damages Cap

0.431

0.495

0

1

Routine Check-up

1.519

0.940

1

4

Age

46.039

16.684

18

99

Female

0.581

0.493

0

1

Black

0.087

0.282

0

1

Hispanic

0.060

0.238

0

1

Married

0.572

0.495

0

1

No. Children

0.766

1.155

0

21

High-School

0.892

0.311

0

1

College

0.291

0.454

0

1

Income between 35K and 75K

0.355

0.479

0

1

Income above 75K

0.137

0.344

0

1

General Health

2.361

1.067

1

5

Health Plan

0.880

0.325

0

1

No. observations: 653587

Because the error terms could be correlated for individuals living in the
same state I correct for clustering by state. The results from this estimation, as
reported in Table 2.12 indicate a positive correlation between the existence of a
non-economic damages cap and our measure of the consumption of preventive
care services. Since the dependent variable takes larger values the longer the
period that passed since the last preventive visit, the estimates obtained are a sign
that people living in states that adopted the cap tend to delay going to the doctor
for preventive visits, providing support for the theory of a longer search period
caused by the introduction of the cap.
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Table 2.12 The Impact of Non-Economic Damages Cap on the Frequency of
Routine Health Check-ups [t statistic in brackets]

Routine Check-up

Non-Economic Damage Cap

0.055
[2.32]

No. Obs.

653587

Sample

1996-2004

Pseudo R2

0.0547

Although not reported, this regression controls for Age, Female, Black, Hispanic, Married,
Number of Children, High-school, College, Income between 35k and 75K, Income above 75k,
General Health, Health Plan, State and Time FE. Weighted regression. Robust standard errors
clustered by state. Sample 1996-2002. Sample size: 653587 observations

Conclusions
The novelty of this paper is that it addresses the issue of a decrease in
demand for medical care brought about by the break in the bonding between
physicians and patients through the malpractice damages payments. The effective
result is that the predicted increase of the number of medical services providers,
doctors, does not automatically imply an increase in the quantity of medical care
actually delivered. This paper recognizes this difference and investigates the
effect of non-economic damages cap on several measures of the quantity of
medical services delivered. I find evidence that the number of patients admitted in
community hospitals, the number outpatient visits, and the number of surgeries
performed in community hospitals is smaller in states that have non-economic
damages caps, while the average duration of hospitalization is somewhat longer.
The interpretation is that the breakage of the quality assurance device affected

75

peoples’ willingness to rely on a service that is now of uncertain quality. They
give up or perhaps delay buying some medical services, resulting in a longer
average duration of hospitalization.
This paper recognizes that it may be the case that the observed correlation
between the reform and various measures of the quantity of medical care is a byproduct of the conditions that favored the reform. After correcting for this
problem the results regarding the quantity of care still hold.
Non-economic damages caps affect various medical specialties
differently; specifically, my results indicate that non-economic damages caps are
associated with a larger proportion of women receiving early prenatal care. It is
not the object of this paper to investigate the differences in the prevailing effect of
reform on medical care delivered for various physicians’ specializations, but such
analysis could indicate where the cap is most helpful or damaging. Nevertheless,
the message of this paper nevertheless is that a cover-all solution is not
necessarily appropriate: while such regulation may be obtaining good results for
certain specialties, it may also be producing damage for others. A targeted
solution may be more appropriate.
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QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY IN MEDICAL CARE: WHAT
TELEMEDICINE TELLS US ABOUT MEDICAL LICENSING

Abstract
In order to preserve the level of medical care quality guaranteed by
licensing, some states took measures to prevent physician-patient telemedicine, a
more accessible but also a lower expected quality service than face-to-face
consultations, by adopting regulation that requires physicians to perform a
physical examination before prescribing drugs. This paper uses variation in this
type of regulation to investigate whether licensing requirements are too strict. The
results indicate that the states that adopted the regulation experienced an increase
in mortality. Because the introduction of an easily accessible but lower quality
service improves outcomes, I conclude that overall licensing requirements are too
strict.
JEL Classifications: I18, I12, K00
Keywords: telemedicine, regulation, medical licensing

Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the market for health care provision is
characterized by asymmetric information. The providers, physicians, have more
information about the quality of the product than do their customers. Because
there is no possibility to check ex-ante the quality of the products, patients may be

reluctant to buy the product, resulting in an inefficiently low quantity of medical
care consumed.
As a result, it has become commonplace for the governments to offer a
quality guarantee in health provision by requiring doctors to prove a minimum
level of competence. Such regulation is expected to increase the expected quality
of medical services and, thus, the demand for care, but to also decrease the supply
of doctors. The ultimate effect on health is ambiguous and depends on the
stringency of the requirements [Kleiner and Kurdle, 2000] because the stringency
of requirements decides the number of practicing physicians and, thus, the ease of
access to care.
More recently the internet era opened the opportunity of improving access
to medical advice through electronic means using what it is called telemedicine.
Telemedicine comprises physician-patient or physician-physician communication
using telephones, videophones, fax machines, computers, or any other device that
enables the transmission of information between parties located at a distance from
each other. These technologies create the potential for medical care delivery to
people located in remote area for whom access to specialized care would
otherwise be prohibitively costly due to transportation costs.
Nevertheless, telemedicine remains controversial. Telemedicine
supporters emphasize the advantage of improved access and of increased
competition leading to more choice for patients at significantly lower costs of
contacting a doctor. Its adversaries point out that there is no realistic way of
monitoring the quality of such services, leading, they argue, to worse health
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outcomes. Practically, telemedicine practices are predicted to partially reverse the
effects of licensing. Licensing prompts an increase in the average quality of care
delivered, but decreases the number of physicians, thereby, raising the costs of
contacting a physician. On the other hand, physician-patient telemedicine
practices ease access, but are predicted to be associated with lower quality
because physicians can not collect as much information about patients in teleencounters as they would in face-to-face encounters. It is not obvious that the
same argument can be made about physician-physician tele-encounters because
this service implies that a physician meets the patient face-to-face even though it
is not the one that establishes the diagnostic. There is a possibility that the
physician that actually meets the patient cannot interpret the information collected
from the physical examination as well as the specialist that was contacted for the
diagnosis, but the risk of missing relevant information is significantly lower than
in the physician-patient encounters. Overall, the result is that if the licensing
requirements were too strict therefore having a net negative effect on health,
telemedicine would provide an improvement in health, but if the licensing
requirements were adequate, telemedicine would worsen health.
Concerns about the quality of care provided through electronic meetings
caused many states to act toward providing a legal setting for telemedicine
practice. In all cases, the stumbling blocks for doctors trying to practice
telemedicine are the same as for doctors with cross-state practice: licensing
requirements for each state and the lack of reimbursement. In addition
telemedicine practitioners face a more pressing problem with no real loophole: the
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existence of regulation requiring an actual physical examination before any
prescriptions may be issued (Table 3.1). The justification behind this regulation is
that telemedicine-practicing physicians do not have as much information when
establishing a diagnosis as the physicians that physically encounter their patients,
increasing the probability of a medical mistake. This hands-on policy prevents
any practice from physicians that are not physically present in the same room with
the patients, effectively ruling out any form of physician-patient telemedicine. On
the other hand, in many states the legislators seem to recognize that the lower
quality argument does not necessarily hold for physician-physician tele-meetings
and allow for drug prescriptions to be made by physicians located at a distance if
the whole process is mediated by another physician that meets the patient face-toface.
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Table 3.1 Summary of State Policies Precluding Physicians to Prescribe Drugs to
Individuals They Have Not Personally Examined

State

Required by Law

Alabama
Alaska

Required by Regulation/Policy

Year

Ala. Admin. Code r. 540-X-9-11ER

2000

AK Administrative Code

Arizona

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-1831 (D.O. Only)

California

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 4067, 2242.1

2000
2000
2000

Colorado

Board Policy

2000

District of Columbia

Board Statement

1998

Florida

Board Rule

2003

Georgia
Indiana

Board Rule
Board Rule

2002
2003

Louisiana

Board Policy

2000

Maine

Board Policy

2002

Maryland

Board Statement

2005

Massachusetts

Board Policy

2001

Mississippi

Board Policy

Kentucky

KRS 311.597(1)(e)

Missouri

2002

334.100.2(4)(h)

Nebraska

Board Policy

Nevada

2000
2001

Nevada Revised Statutes 453.3643

2001
2001

New Mexico

Board Rule

2001

New York

Board Statement

2003

North Carolina
Ohio

Board Statement
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731-11-09

1999
1999

Oklahoma

Board Policy

2001

Oregon

Board Rule

2000

South Carolina

Board Rule

2001

Tennessee

Board Statement

2000

Texas

Board Rule

2003

Virginia

Code 54.1-3303 and 54.1-3434.1

2000

Washington

Board Policy

2002

Source: Federation of State Medical Boards; Office for the Advancement of Telehealth; States
Legislatures

This paper uses state level variation in the regulations requiring physicians
to perform a physical examination before prescribing drugs to test the hypothesis
that licensing requirements are too strict. Since telemedicine is predicted to
partially reverse the effects of licensing regulation, states that passed the physical
requirement regulation, thus preventing physician-patient telemedicine, provide
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not only a way to test the effect of telemedicine on health but also a way to test
whether licensing requirements are too strict and whether lower quality but larger
quantity of medical care would improve outcomes. If licensing requirements were
too strict and telemedicine improves outcomes, any regulation that prevents
telemedicine will affect health negatively. Therefore, by looking at the effect of a
regulation that prevents physician-patient telemedicine we can infer whether the
licensing requirements were too strict in the first place.
Section 3.2 describes the link between regulation in the medical field,
quality and quantity of medical care delivered, and outcomes; Section 3.3
introduces the theoretical model; Section 3.4 describes the empirical results; and
Section 3.5 concludes.

The Link Between the Regulation of Medical Care Quality and Health Outcomes
The health care market is characterized by asymmetric information: the
seller has more information about the quality of the service than the buyer,
potentially leading to quality deterioration [Akerlof, 1970]. This characteristic of
the market, as Arrow [1963] notes, makes necessary the development of trust
relations between physicians and patients and highlights the social value of a
reliable source of information about the quality of the service. The result is the
creation of social institutions that theoretically provide reliable information,
reducing the uncertainty regarding quality and increasing demand for medical
services. An example of such an endeavor is professional licensing of physicians.
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As a practical matter, physicians can obtain licenses that allow them to
practice medicine if they are able to pass some competency tests. Therefore,
licensing guarantees that physicians have a minimum level of competence
determined by the strictness of the tests. As a byproduct, there are fewer doctors
and, thus, less competition. So at any point in time in the medical field as in many
other fields the question remains: was licensing in the public interest or was it
driven by the desire to create monopolies? The answer is not an obvious one way
or the other but rather, as Moore [1961] finds after surveying licensing
regulations, often licensing is not strictly in the public interest and extends also
into the realm of competition restrictions. If the tests are designed by professional
groups, then we should expect that in the process of maximizing net gains the
group will choose standards higher than optimal [Leland, 1979]. But that
licensing may support both consumer interest and may also restrict competition is
consistent with the idea that regulators that respond to pressures from different
interest groups do not grant perfect cartels with their regulations [Peltzman,
1976]. In fact, there is evidence to support that medical licensing tends to create a
monopoly [Friedman and Kuznet, 1945; Kessel, 1958] but also that licensing is
consumer-demand driven [Leffler, 1978]. Therefore, even if we accept that
licensing is socially desirable, we should still question whether licensing
requirements are too strict. Standards that are too high not only increase the
monetary price of medical care but also make access to care difficult.
All else held constant, there is a way to ease access to medical care: the
practice of medicine at distance through what we now call telemedicine. While
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such practices existed even in the 1960’s and 1970’s, telemedicine really took off
in the 1990’s when the improvements in technology made telemedicine more
useful and reliable [Emery, 1998]. The notion of telemedicine today covers both
physician-patient and physician-physician communications using telephones,
videophones, fax machines, computers, or any other devices that enables the
transmission of information between parties located at distance.
While physician-physician communication is generally viewed in a
positive light because patients benefit from both face-to-face consultations but
also from specialized advice that otherwise would be inaccessible to them,
physician-patient telemedicine remains controversial. The controversy stems from
the fact that even if telemedicine consultations have a lower transportation cost
and lower time cost both in time spent in transportation [Smith et al., 2003] and in
time spent in the consultation [Guilfoyle et al., 2003] and significantly improve
access to medical care [Martinez et al., 2004], they also provide less information
to the physician, creating potential for mistakes. Comparisons of telemedicine
with face-to-face consultations, of which I will mention just a few for brevity,
indicate that this may indeed be the case. Smith et al. [2006] finds that of 58 ear,
nose and throat assessments, in 81% of the cases the diagnosis was the same in
the case of tele-consultations and face-to-face consultation. In the case of trauma
the percent of incorrect tele-diagnoses was even smaller: only approximately 2%
or less of the original tele-diagnoses was considered incorrect after face-to-face
review [Tachakra et al., 02/2000; Tachakra et al., 12/2000]. There is also evidence
of a higher incidence of mistakes in teledermatology compared to face-to-face
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encounters [Loane M.A. et al, 1998; Chao et al., 2003; Oztas et al., 2004; Oakley
A. M. M. et al., 2006] even when a general practitioner was present with the
patient in the videoconference room [Nordal E.J et al., 2001], but no real evidence
of this sort for genetic services [Stalker H.J. et al., 2006]. More information about
the outcomes of such comparisons are easily available in reviews of the literature
[Currell R. et al., 2000; Miller E. A., 2001; Hersh W. et al, 2002; Hersh W.R. et
al, 2006], which indicate, just as the small sample that I mentioned above, that
telemedicine offers services of close but somewhat lower quality than face-to-face
consultation, and that the relative quality varies with the type of health problem
targeted. Therefore, by introducing the option of a service of lower quality but
cheaper, physician-patient telemedicine partially offsets the impact of licensing
requirements. If as a result of interest groups pressure the regulator adopted
requirements that were too strict, telemedicine would have a positive effect on
health; otherwise its impact would be negative and the society would be better off
without it.
Under the assumption that current licensing requirements are justified, the
quality of physician-patient telecare services is too low and that is why several
states took steps to prevent such activities by requiring physicians to meet their
patients in person before prescribing drugs (Table 3.1). The effect of this
requirement again depends on how strict licensing requirements were in the first
place. If the standard was justified or too low, then physician-patient telemedicine
would only worsen the situation, so the introduction of a physical examination
requirement would improve health outcomes. On the other hand, if the standard

85

was too high, as predicted by theory when the standard is set by professional
groups, like in case of medicine, then telemedicine probably improves outcomes,
and the physical examination requirement would have a negative effect. The
caveat is that the effect would also depend on the relative quality of telemedicine
and traditional medical services, but since the literature indicates only a small
difference in quality this should not be a major concern for the purpose of this
analysis.

The Effect of Physical Examination Requirement on Health
Consumers in need of treatment frequently demanded physician
consultations involving physical examinations even before they became
mandatory by law. Such consultations entail some costs above the price of the
actual consultation: the transportation cost and the opportunity cost of time spent
traveling. The alternatives to meeting a physician would be either obtaining a
physician’s advice through telephone, e-mail, fax, Internet and/or other electronic
means, or self-treatment. However, if the physical examination is required the
only alternative is self-treatment. Once it is understood that the presence of
regulation does not imply that every person with health problems will actually
meet with a doctor and that there is a real possibility some will give up physician
consultations altogether, the implications of such regulation for consumer health
are less clear than might be imagined.
The ambiguity arises from the effect of the law on various groups of the
population. The marginal effect of this hands-on policy is to raise the cost of
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access to medical advice for some individuals. Among the individuals that would
have used telemedicine services, under the regulation some will choose to meet a
physician in person and some will give up obtaining professional advice because
it would be too expensive. Those that switch from electronically obtained advice
to advice based on face-to face encounters obtain a higher quality service, thus,
experiencing an improvement in health. However, those that exchange
electronically obtained professional advice for self-treatment suffer a decline in
health because they have a higher probability of making a mistake than a
physician.
Let the individual’s utility be increasing at a decreasing rate in
consumption and health:

U i = C H , where O + R <1, C represents consumption, and H health.

Health depends on the type of medical care acquired. The treatment based
on face-to-face encounters with physicians is the highest quality service,
providing the most significant improvement in health, but it is also the most
expensive. Self-treatment is the cheapest option but also the lowest in quality,
bringing the lowest expected improvement in health. The third option is the
electronically obtained advice, cheaper than physical consultations but more
expensive than self-treatment. When physical examination is required, this third
option is not available.

87

Q1 if physical consultation
H = Q2 if tele-consultation
Q3 if self-treatment
where Q1 costs P1, Q2 costs P2, and Q3 costs P3, with P1>P2>P3.

The individual maximizes utility subject to discrete choices of health and
to an income constraint:

L = C H + (Y C Pj ) , where j=1,2,3, the price of consumption goods
is normalized to 1, and Y represents total income.

The implication is that individuals choose the type of medical care to use
function of the level of their income:

1) face-to-face consultation if

Y

/
PQ
1 1
Q1 /

P2Q2 /
&Y
Q2 /

/
PQ
1 1
Q1 /

P3Q3 /
Q3 /

(17)

2) tele-consultation if

P2Q2 /
Q2 /

P3Q3 /
Q3 /

/
PQ
1 1
Y<
Q1 /

P2Q2 /
Q2 /
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(18)

3) self-treatment if

PQ
Y < 2 2/
Q2

/
P3Q3 /
PQ
1 1
&Y <
Q3 /
Q1 /

P3Q3 /
Q3 /

(19)

The choice of telemedicine is only relevant under the condition that:
P2Q2 /
Q2 /

/
P3Q3 /
PQ
1 1
<
Q3 /
Q1 /

/
P3Q3 /
PQ
1 1
<
Q3 /
Q1 /

P2Q2 /
, otherwise, nobody ever
Q2 /

chooses this type of service. Because I investigate the impact of a regulation that
came into being due to the exertion of this choice, I continue the analysis under
this constraint.
Given the existence of the physical examination requirement, teleconsultations are not available; therefore, utility maximization involves the
following choice:

1) face-to-face consultation if Y

2) self-treatment if Y <

/
PQ
1 1
Q1 /

/
PQ
1 1
Q1 /

P3Q3 /
Q3 /

P3Q3 /
Q3 /

(20)

(21)

Consequently, with a physical examination requirement, all individuals in the
P2Q2 /
Q2 /

/
P3Q3 / PQ
1 1
;
Q3 /
Q1 /

P3Q3 /
Q3 /

range of income switch from tele-

consultations to self-treatment and, thus, experience a decline in health. On the
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other hand, all individuals in the

/
PQ
1 1
Q1 /

/
P3Q3 / PQ
1 1
;
Q3 /
Q1 /

P2Q2 /
Q2 /

range of

income switch from tele-consultations to face-to-face consultations and, thus,
experience an improvement in health.
Therefore, the net effect of the regulation is function of the relative quality
and relative prices of various types of care, and of the income distribution of
population. Specifically, the regulation will lead to an improvement in health if:

/
PQ
1 1

Q1 /

PQ
1 1

/

Q1 /

/
PQ
1 1

P2Q2 /
Q2 /

P3Q3
Q3 /

f ( I )dI >
/

Q1 /

P3Q3 /
Q3 /

f ( I )dI
P2Q2

/

Q2 /

P3Q3

/

(22)

Q3 /

where f(I) is the density of the income distribution of the population.

Because the proportion of people that seek medical advice based on faceto-face encounters with physicians is determined by the price and quality of this
service, which are set through licensing requirements, ultimately the net impact of
a physical examination requirement will provide information on the effectiveness
of the current level of licensing requirements.

Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Licensing Requirements
This paper uses a panel data analysis over the period 1995-2003 to
investigate the impact of regulations requiring physicians to perform a physical
examination prior to prescribing drugs on state level mortality rates. The source of
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state level mortality data from different causes is the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) but because some data is listed as unreliable due to very
small mortality rates (example: diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue,
diseases of the eye and adnexa, diseases of the ear and mastoid process, etc.), I
only retain the following categories: mortality from medical care adverse effects,
from diseases of the digestive system, respiratory system, circulatory system,
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, and mortality from endocrine,
nutritional and metabolic diseases and immunity disorders. It should be noted that
in 1999 the Tenth Revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD10) replaced the previously used ICD-9 to code the underlying cause-of-death. As
a result, the category that includes mortality from endocrine, nutritional and
metabolic diseases and immunity disorders was split into two groups: mortality
from endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases was listed separately and
mortality from immunity disorders was included in the same category as diseases
of the blood-forming organs. Consequently, for the period 1999-2003 I added the
mortality rate from endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and mortality
rate from immunity disorders to obtain a category comparable to the one listed for
previous years (more information about the conversion of the ICD9 to ICD10 is
available at: http://www.tdrdata.com/ipd/ipd_icdcodetools.aspx?SessionGUID=).
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The panel dataset is used for a fixed-effects analysis including several
control variables:

Mortality ratest = R1 (P.E.R.)st + R1 Xst + `s + Xt +ast, where s indexes states
and t time.

The dependent variable is the mortality rate per 100,000 individuals, not
adjusted by age. On the right-hand side, P.E.R. stands for Physical Examination
Regulation, and it is a dummy variable indicating whether in a particular state and
year there was any regulation requiring physicians to perform physical
examinations on their patients before prescribing drugs, regardless on whether it
was required by law or only by the Medical Board. X is a vector of state-level
controls including: percent uninsured, income per-capita, percent high-school
graduates, percent 65 years old or older, percent black, health and hospital
expenditures per capita, hospitals per 100 square-miles, and percent investorowned hospitals, `s and Xt represent state and year fixed effects, and ast is the error
term.
When controlling for economic conditions through income per-capita
variable, percent uninsured offers a measure of the intensity of the demand for
medical care. The percent high-school graduates variable is included because of
the strong correlation between education and health. Percent 65 years old or older
controls for differences in mortality rates coming from differences in the age
structure of the state population. State health and hospital expenditures may
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influence life expectancy in just the same way as a higher number of hospitals
would: namely, by easing access to medical care. I use the number of hospitals
per square-mile because it gives a better estimate of the transportation costs
associated with the consumption of medical services. Percent investor-owned
hospitals is included because organizational structure may influence efficiency
and as a result health outcomes too.

Table 3.2 Summary Statistics

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Source

P.E.R.

0.184

0.388

Mortality: Medical Care Adverse Effects

1.062

0.414

CDC

Mortality: Diseases of the Digestive System

30.454

4.249

CDC

(per 100,000)
Mortality: Diseases of the Respiratory System

85.066

15.054

CDC

334.324

67.149

CDC

4.685

1.291

CDC

35.434

7.384

CDC

Uninsured

14.116

4.002

Census

Income (per capita, in thousands,

15.786

2.384

BEA

19.236

2.604

IRS

6.588

2.355

IRS

High-School

84.437

4.364

Census

Bachelor

24.412

4.599

Census

5.541

0.845

NCES

(per 100,000)

(per 100,000)
Mortality: Diseases of the Circulatory System
(per 100,000)
Mortality: Diseases of the Musculoskeletal
System and Connective Tissue(per 100,000)
Mortality: Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic
Diseases and Immunity Disorders (per 100,000)

deflated using CPI)
Percent of Population with an Adjusted Gross
Income between $50,000 and $100,000

1

Percent of Population with an Adjusted Gross
Income above $100,000 1

College Enrollment

Continues on next page
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics (continued)

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Source

>65

12.618

1.916

Census

Black

10.160

9.513

Census

148.896

55.871

Census

0.265

0.251

AHA

12.439

12.012

AHA

0.486

0.250

AHA

5511.042

6029.454

>50% Non-Metropolitan

0.244

0.430

CPS

Farm Acreage (mil. acres)

0.423

0.264

Statistical Abstract

Public Libraries 1

0.306

0.342

NCES

91.755

11.591

NCES

State Health and Hospital Exp. (per capita,
deflated using CPI)
Hospitals/100 sq. miles
Investor Owned Hospitals (percent of total)
Urban Hospitals (percent of total)
Population (in thousands)

Census

of the US

Internet 1

State level data from 1995-2003: 450 observations. CDC: Center for Disease Control and
Prevention; IRS: Internal Revenues Service, United States Department of Treasury BEA: Bureau
of Economic Analysis; AHA Hospital Statistics 2000, 2005; NCES: National Center for Education
Statistics
1
Sample data: 1997-2002

The results from the empirical analysis performed on this data are
presented below in Table 3.3. All regressions are weighted least squares, the
weights being state population. Standard errors are computed using the WhiteHuber estimator.
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Table 3.3 The Impact of Physical Examination Requirement (P.E.R.) on Mortality
from Different Causes [t statistic in brackets]

Medical

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases of the

Care

of the

of the

of the

Musculoskeletal

Endocrine,
Nutritional,

Adverse

Digestive

Respiratory

Circulatory

System and

Metabolic

Effects

System

System

System

Connective

Diseases and

Tissue

Immunity
Disorders

P.E.R.

Uninsured

Income

High-School

>65

Black

-0.102

0.343

0.051

0.995

0.144

0.656

[-2.61]

[1.98]

[0.05]

[0.83]

[2.04]

[2.5]

-0.032

-0.019

0.061

-0.101

0.034

-0.017

[-3.5]

[-0.47]

[0.42]

[-0.32]

[2.26]

[-0.29]

-0.104

-0.397

-1.498

1.974

0.004

-0.366

[-2.85]

[-2.5]

[-2.23]

[1.61]

[0.07]

[-1.54]

0.002

-0.006

0.372

-0.940

-0.012

0.084

[0.21]

[-0.14]

[2.36]

[-2.86]

[-0.66]

[1.32]

-0.105

1.316

4.099

14.893

0.360

1.292

[-1.59]

[5.99]

[3.84]

[6.7]

[3.59]

[3.92]

-0.128

0.426

1.737

-3.447

0.379

-0.462

[-2.2]

[2.02]

[1.98]

[-1.76]

[4.68]

[-1.37]

State Health

-0.001

-0.009

-0.021

0.092

0.000

-0.006

and Hospital

[-1.5]

[-2.5]

[-1.84]

[3.56]

[0.09]

[-1.05]

Expenditures
Hospitals/

-0.216

8.879

10.540

15.725

0.179

14.174

100 sq. miles

[-0.39]

[2.5]

[0.92]

[0.97]

[0.19]

[3.67]

Investor

-0.006

0.076

0.062

0.239

-0.014

-0.160

Owned

[-0.88]

[2.65]

[0.69]

[1.26]

[-1.34]

[-3.97]

Hospitals
Year effects

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

State FE

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

No. Obs.
R squared

450
0.799

450
0.946

450

450

0.941

0.991

450
0.906

450
0.970

Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.
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The physical examination requirement regulation has a negative and
significant effect on mortality from medical care adverse effects, consistent with
the previous literature indicating that physicians have a higher probability of
making a mistake if they use only communication at a distance for diagnosis.
Therefore, this result provides support for the view that the physician-patient type
of telemedicine may be of somewhat lower quality. On the other hand, this
regulation is positively correlated with the mortality from all other listed causes,
and the coefficients are significant in the case of the mortality rate from diseases
of the digestive system, mortality from diseases of the musculoskeletal system
and connective tissue, and mortality from endocrine, nutritional and metabolic
diseases and immunity disorders.
These estimates provide support for the idea that physician-patient
telemedicine has a positive impact on the health of at least a part of the
population. The order of magnitude as well as the significance of the coefficients
varies with the cause of mortality. The regulation has a relatively large effect on
mortality from endocrine, nutritional, metabolic diseases and immunity disorders
but only a small effect on the mortality from diseases of the musculoskeletal
system and connective tissue.
The rest of the coefficients also seem plausible. Income per capita, when
significant, is negatively correlated with mortality, as expected if health is a
normal good, and a larger percent of elderly is positively correlated with
mortality. There is a positive association between a larger percent of black
population and mortality for most causes, but there is a negative association with

96

the mortality rate from medical care adverse effects. The probable explanation is
that minorities tend to have poorer access to medical care and, thus, there are
fewer opportunities for mistakes. This does not imply that minorities experience
better health, but rather that the reported cause of death for them would likely not
be medical care adverse effects but the underlying health problem that would have
required medical care. The coefficients on the state health and hospital
expenditures variable vary with the cause of death and, thus, do not readily admit
a straight-forward interpretation. A possible explanation for these results is that
these regressions only control for the total amount spent without regard for where
the money goes or the efficiency of spending. The number of hospitals per squaremile is positively correlated with mortality from all causes except medical care
adverse effects. The negative correlation with medical mistakes is probably the
result of increased competition, because easy access to more physicians implies
low costs of switching from one physician to another, creating incentives for
hospitals to monitor quality more closely. The positive correlation with all other
types of mortality can be caused by selection. Since hospitals are more likely to
locate in areas with high demand for medical care, and lower health may generate
higher demand for medical care, we would observe more hospitals located in high
mortality areas. The same explanations work for the coefficients on the percent
investor-owned hospitals, especially since we would expect that profitmaximizing investors would choose to locate their facilities in regions with higher
demand for medical services.
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A sensitivity check of the results is performed and some of the results
reported in Table 3.4. The baseline results are compared first with the results
obtained after excluding Alaska, the state with lowest mortality rate. Then the
highest mortality state is excluded: New Mexico in the case of mortality from
medical care adverse effects, Wyoming in the case of mortality from diseases of
the digestive system, West Virginia in the case of mortality from diseases of the
respiratory system, of the circulatory system, and from endocrine, nutritional and
metabolic diseases and immunity disorders, and Montana in the case of mortality
from diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue. In all cases,
the results are comparable with the results obtained from the baseline
specification. When controlling for geographically correlated factors by
augmenting the baseline specification with region-year interactions, the results are
in general comparable but understandably weaker given the drop in the number of
degrees of freedom. There is also a surprising result regarding the impact of
regulation on mortality from diseases of the circulatory system: the coefficient is
negative and significant.9
Because some diseases reinforce other health problems or perhaps external
factors create conditions for the onset of several types of diseases, there may be
correlation between different types of mortality. Zellner’s seemingly unrelated
estimation reported in the 5th line of estimates controls exactly for such a problem
and indicates even stronger results. And finally, the last line estimators control for
possible contemporaneous correlation of disturbances across panels and for firstorder autocorrelation AR(1) within panels and the results still hold.
9

This result is driven by the South region and it disappears in the IV estimation.
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Table 3.4 Sensitivity Check of Physical Examination Requirement Coefficient to
Alternative Specifications [t statistic in brackets]

Medical

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases of the

Endocrine,

Care

of the

of the

of the

Musculoskeletal

Nutritional,

Adverse

Digestive

Respiratory

Circulatory

System and

Metabolic

Effects

System

System

System

Connective

Diseases and

Tissue

Immunity
Disorders

Baseline1

-0.102

0.343

0.051

0.995

0.144

0.656

[-2.61]

[1.98]

[0.05]

[0.83]

[2.04]

[2.5]

Exclude Lowest

-0.103

0.353

0.050

0.922

0.147

0.654

Mortality State 1

[-2.63]

[2.04]

[0.05]

[0.76]

[2.09]

[2.48]

Exclude Highest

-0.105

0.348

0.077

0.879

0.146

0.738

Mortality State1

[-2.7]

[2.01]

[0.08]

[0.73]

[2.07]

[2.82]

Include Region-

-0.078

0.311

0.321

-2.673

0.142

0.661

Year Interactions1

[-1.79]

[1.59]

[0.55]

[-2.42]

[1.96]

[2.46]

Simultaneous

-0.099

0.369

0.272

1.047

0.139

0.618

Estimation2

[-2.67]

[2.23]

[0.44]

[0.91]

[2.1]

[2.52]

Control for Serial

-0.102

0.303

0.213

0.228

0.138

0.617

Correlation (AR1)3

[-2.75]

[1.82]

[0.22]

[0.17]

[1.99]

[2.27]

1

These regressions control for Uninsured, Income, High-school, 65+, Black, State Health and
Hospital Expenditures, Hospitals/sq. mile, Investor Owned Hospitals, State FE, and Year FE.
2
All previous covariates are included. In addition the first equations controls for Urban Hospitals,
the second equations for Bachelors, the third for High-School and College Enrollment, the fourth
for High-School and South Region - Year interactions, the fifth for High-School and Farm
Acreage, and the sixth for High-school and Population Density.
3
Prais-Winsten regressions, correlated panels corrected standard errors.

Besides identifying this effect, it should be acknowledged that the impact
of changes in the character and structure of medical care today sometimes has
have lag effects. As a result, we might observe a larger effect of the regulation as
time passes. I estimate the impact of the number of years the regulation was in
place on mortality and report the results in Table 3.5. The results are plausible:
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there is a significant instantaneous effect of regulation on mortality from medical
care adverse effects but no cumulative effect since the impact of medical mistakes
is often felt immediately. On the other hand, for all other types of mortality the
cumulative effect is strongly significant, because changes in the ease of access to
medical care will have not only instantaneous effects but also delayed effects.
Therefore, one should be cautious in drawing conclusions about the magnitude of
the effects because, at this point in time, we may not be observing the full impact
of the regulation for all types of mortality causes.

Table 3.5 The Cumulative Effect of Physical Examination Requirement on
Mortality [t statistic in brackets]

Medical

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases of the

Endocrine,

Care

of the

of the

of the

Musculoskeletal

Nutritional,

Adverse

Digestive

Respiratory

Circulatory

System and

Metabolic

Effects

System

System

System

Connective

Diseases and

Tissue

Immunity
Disorders

P.E.R.

-0.119

0.041

-0.629

-2.309

0.019

0.154

[-2.12]

[0.19]

[-0.77]

[-1.61]

[0.2]

[0.45]

P.E.R. Cumulative

0.011

0.185

0.416

2.023

0.076

0.308

Effect

[0.5]

[2.2]

[1.35]

[3.15]

[2.06]

[2.16]

Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator. All
previous covariates are included.

The postulated positive effect of a physical examination requirement on
health is explained by the reduced access to medical care for a certain part of
population. In practice, this usually refers to people located in rural areas who
incur high transportation costs in order to get to a physician’s office for a physical
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consultation. Therefore, the prediction is that this policy is going to have larger
negative effect on health in states that are predominantly rural. In order to test this
prediction, I identify the states that are predominantly rural and test whether the
regulation has a different impact on these states compared with predominantly
urban states. For this purpose, I use CPS data on the percentage of people living
in non-metropolitan areas. If more than 50% of the population is living in nonmetropolitan areas, I expect to observe the regulation having a larger positive
impact on mortality. The results reported in Table 3.6 provide some evidence that
this is indeed the case. The physical examination requirement has a larger impact
on mortality from diseases of the respiratory system and on mortality from
endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and immunity disorders in states
where the majority of population lives in non-metropolitan areas.
The implication is that telemedicine managed to penetrate areas
disadvantaged from the point of view of access to medical care, bringing real
relief for at least some types of health problems. It is unclear whether the result
does not hold across medical fields because some types of telemedicine services
did not manage penetrate rural areas yet or because the measure used for the
number of people located in rural areas is too noisy, but it would be interesting to
know whether and why would people located in rural areas buy some types of
telecare but not others.
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Table 3.6 The Impact of Physical Examination Requirement on Mortality in
Predominantly Rural States [t statistic in brackets]

Medical

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases of the

Endocrine,

Care

of the

of the

of the

Musculoskeletal

Nutritional,

Adverse

Digestive

Respiratory

Circulatory

System and

Metabolic

Effects

System

System

System

Connective

Diseases and

Tissue

Immunity
Disorders

P.E.R.

-0.109

0.359

-0.129

1.154

0.146

0.579

[-2.74]

[2.04]

[-0.13]

[0.93]

[2.04]

[2.17]

(P.E.R.) * (>50%

0.134

-0.231

3.523

-3.526

-0.015

1.663

Non-Metro)

[1.36]

[-0.35]

[2.22]

[-1.13]

[-0.07]

[3.38]

>50% Non-Metro

0.142

-1.261

-0.263

6.568

-0.377

-2.407

[1.36]

[-2.17]

[-0.13]

[0.73]

[-1.5]

[-1.09]

All previous covariates are included. Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors
computed using White-Huber estimator.

Previous literature [Emery, 1998] indicates that investor-owned hospitals
are less likely to adopt telemedicine technology. It could be that this is considered
a risky investment since it had not been thoroughly tested, but the more likely
explanation is that these hospitals postpone investing in telemedicine related
technology until the states decide definitively the legal setting in which
telemedicine practitioners can act. If that is the case, then perhaps physicians
located in those states would be less likely to engage in physician-patient type of
telemedicine practices. The prediction is that regulation would be less binding in
states that have predominantly investor-owned hospitals because there would be
less telemedicine practiced in these states in the first place. Table 3.7 reports the
results from the empirical test of this prediction. I find that the physical
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examination requirement has a smaller impact on mortality from diseases of the
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue and on mortality from endocrine,
nutritional and metabolic diseases and immunity disorders in states where a larger
proportion of the hospitals are investor-owned, validating the previous prediction.
One should note that if something hinders the development of
telemedicine, the predicted effect of regulation on health would not necessarily be
biased downward. An estimate would be biased downward under the hypothesis
that the practice of telemedicine on a larger scale would bring additional benefits.
Since telemedicine is not very pervasive, the sample of data used in this papers
only registers marginal changes, but if the quality of the marginal service drops
with increased delivery at some point the quality could be too low and
telemedicine would negatively affect health. Of course, this argument only holds
when there is no technological progress that could increase the quality of
electronic information and improve the quality of telecare services, but it
highlights the necessity of caution in extrapolating these results out of sample.
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Table 3.7 The Impact of Physical Examination Requirement on Mortality
Function of the Organizational Structure of Hospitals [t statistic in brackets]

Medical

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases of the

Endocrine,

Care

of the

of the

of the

Musculoskeletal

Nutritional,

Adverse

Digestive

Respiratory

Circulatory

System and

Metabolic

Effects

System

System

System

Connective

Diseases and

Tissue

Immunity
Disorders

P.E.R.

P.E.R.* Investor
Owned Hospitals

-0.099

0.688

0.102

-1.090

0.507

1.228

[-1.93]

[1.94]

[0.12]

[-0.57]

[3.82]

[3.75]

0.000

-0.019

-0.003

0.113

-0.020

-0.144

[-0.07]

[-1.24]

[-0.07]

[1.14]

[-3.65]

[-3.35]

Investor Owned

-0.006

0.086

0.064

0.179

-0.004

-0.031

Hospitals

[-0.87]

[3.02]

[0.65]

[0.92]

[-0.36]

[-2.07]

All previous covariates are included. Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors
computed using White-Huber estimator.

A source of concern with the previous estimates would be that perhaps the
adoption of such regulation is endogenous. The policy makers may decide to
require physicians to perform physical examinations before prescribing drugs
because the previously recorded rate of mortality indicated that the quality of
medical care in these states was too low. Such decisions would make the
existence of regulation to be positively correlated with the rate of mortality.
In order to identify the effect of regulation on mortality, a variable is
required that would change incentives to adopt the regulation but would not affect
mortality directly. The variables used here are the number of public libraries per
capita relative to the percent tax returns filed for incomes from salaries and wages
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between $50,000 and $100,000 10, and the percent of public libraries that offer
internet services.
There are two main categories that are affected by the regulation: one is
physicians because the regulation reduces competition and the other is formed by
people who want to buy telemedicine services because face-to-face consultations
are too expensive and who will be made better off by telemedicine whether this
would improve their health or not because it would increase their overall utility.
Since it is postulated that regulators do not offer perfect cartels [Pelzman, 1976],
the probability that the regulator will support one party or the other depends on
the state of the world at the time the regulation is introduced. Since according to
the theoretical model telemedicine has the largest impact on people with relatively
low incomes per household but perhaps not the poorest, I chose a measure of
redistribution toward this category of population: those that are really rich do not
need the services provided by public libraries, while those that are really poor are
less likely to use them due to the expected characteristics of their occupation.
More public libraries relative to this segment of population translate into more
redistribution toward them: the regulator may be less sensitive to the demand of
this part of the population and be more likely to adopt regulation that would
prevent telemedicine. A similar argument stands behind the choice of the second
instrument: the percent of public libraries that have internet. Physician-patient

10

The source of data on number of individuals earning between 50,000 and 100,000:

Internal Revenue Service, United States Department of the Treasury at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=98123,00.html
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telemedicine implies that the patient has access to the contact information of
physicians located at distance; it also implies that patients should be able to
transmit verbal and/or written information or even images to the physician. The
percent of public libraries that offer internet services represents a proxy for the
rate of adoption of technology in the state. If the rate of adoption is higher, then
there are more people that could benefit from telemedicine and the policy maker
would be less likely to adopt the regulation.
It could be argued that the number of public libraries per capita relative to
the percent tax returns filed for incomes from salaries and wages between 50,000
and 100,000 USD is correlated with the degree of inequality in the state, which in
turn may be correlated with mortality. So I introduce measures of inequality in the
regressions: specifically, I introduce the proportion of tax returns filed for
incomes from salaries and wages between $50,000 and $100,000 and the
proportion filed for incomes from salaries and wages above $100,000. Once I
solve this problem, it is reasonable to expect that the number of public libraries
per capita relative to the percent tax returns filed for incomes from salaries and
wages between $50,000 and $100,000 is not correlated with mortality. Also if the
rate of adoption of technology is to be a valid instrument, it should not be
correlated with mortality. The most obvious correlation arises from the fact that it
is likely that states having a better educated population also adopt technology
faster. It may also be the case that a higher population density generates spillovers
that would increase the rate of technology adoption. Since population density
could influence mortality from at least some causes, respiratory diseases for
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instance, I augment the baseline specification to include population density.
Having controlled for income inequality, the level of education of people residing
in the states, and population density, it is reasonable to argue that the percent of
public libraries offering internet services is otherwise uncorrelated with mortality.
Due to data availability issues regarding the instruments used, the sample
drops to 300 observations representing data between 1997 and 2002. Table 3.8
shows first the results obtained from the baseline specification augmented with
the population density variable on this smaller sample and then the results from
the IV estimation. The results from the baseline specification are comparable with
the results obtained on the larger dataset but somewhat weaker, to be expected
since the sample size drops by 33%. The IV estimates are larger than the baseline
ones but, with two exceptions, Hausman tests do not indicate endogeneity
problems. The two exceptions refer to the results obtained in the case of mortality
from diseases of the circulatory system and in the case of mortality from
endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and immunity disorders. In both
cases the coefficient on the regulation remains positive and becomes larger.
Since the number of instruments exceeds the number of the endogenous
regressors, it is possible to perform a test of the exogeneity of the extra
instruments. This is a chi square test computed as N* R2, where N is the number
of observations and R2 is the unadjusted R2 from a regression of IV residuals on
all exogenous variables plus all the instruments. The critical value for this test is
3.84, so I conclude that the two variables used as instruments are exogenous and,
thus, valid as instruments for the physical examination requirement variable.
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The overall pattern of coefficients in tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.8 indicates that
states that require physicians to perform a physical examination before
prescribing drugs experience a drop in the mortality from medical care adverse
effects, consistent with the hypothesized lower quality of physician-patient
telemedicine services. On the other hand, states that adopted the regulation
display higher mortality rates from diseases of the digestive system, circulatory
system, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, and mortality from
endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and immunity disorders. The
interpretation is that the population in these states would have been healthier if the
practice of physician-patient telemedicine would have been allowed. The meaning
of this result is that licensing requirements for physicians in these specialties are
too strict and the population would be healthier if there were more physicians
even if the marginal physician would be of lower quality.
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Table 3.8 The Impact of Physical Examination Requirement on Mortality: IV

Coefficient on the Physical Examination Requirement Variable
[t]
Medical

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases

Diseases of the

Care

of the

of the

of the

Musculoskeletal

Nutritional,

Adverse

Digestive

Respiratory

Circulatory

System and

Metabolic

Effects

System

System

System

Connective

Diseases and

Tissue

Immunity

Endocrine,

Disorders
Baseline +

-0.082

0.269

0.733

0.512

0.167

0.466

(300 obs.)

[-1.53]

[1.38]

[0.52]

[0.42]

[1.98]

[1.34]

IV

-0.120

-0.115

-1.592

11.587

0.082

2.454

[-1.01]

[-0.23]

[-0.76]

[3.16]

[0.37]

[2.89]

First Stage
Public Libraries

3.585

[t]

[3.46]

Internet

-0.013

[t]

[-3.36]

No. Obs.
F

300
8.99

R squared

0.7219

WU t Test of

0.31

0.85

0.98

-3.48

0.4

-2.49

0.36

3

0.78

0.48

1.86

0.21

Exogeneity
S2 Test of
Overidentifying
Restrictions

These regressions control for Uninsured, Income, High-school, 65+, Black, State Health and
Hospital Expenditures, Hospitals/sq. mile, Investor Owned Hospitals, Population Density, Income
Distribution, State FE, and Year FE. Regressions weighted by population. Standard errors
computed using White-Huber estimator.

A policy maker may not be interested only in knowing what are the
specialties for which the licensing requirement are too strict but also in the overall
effect of the current level of licensing requirements. The results reported in Table
3.9 indicate that the regulation leads to an increase in total mortality, meaning
that, overall, the licensing requirements are too strict. Therefore, telemedicine can
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bring real gains even if the current state of technology does not enable physicians
to collect as much information through tele-encounters as they would in face-to
face consultations.

Table 3.9 The Impact of Physical Examination Requirement on Total Mortality
Rate

Coefficient on the Physical
Examination Requirement Variable
[t]
Baseline +

4.577

(300 obs.)

[2.12]

IV

16.580

Wu t Test of

[-2.22]

[2.9]
Exogeneity
S2 Test of Overidentyfying

0

Restrictions

These regressions control for Uninsured, Income, High-school, 65+, Black, State Health
and Hospital Expenditures, Hospitals/sq. mile, Investor Owned Hospitals, Population
Density, Income Distribution, State FE, and Year FE.. Regressions weighted by
population. Standard errors computed using White-Huber estimator.

Conclusions
Using variation in the regulation of procedures required before drugs may
be prescribed by physicians, this paper develops a way to test whether licensing
requirements in the medical field are too strict. In an attempt to preserve the
quality guarantee offered by the current level of licensing requirements, several
states introduced regulation that prevents physician-patient telemedicine practices,
which are expected to be of lower quality because physicians cannot collect all
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relevant information during tele-encounters. Such regulation requires physicians
to perform a physical examination before prescribing drugs, thus, eliminating
physician-patient telemedicine. This type of regulation generates the same
quality-quantity trade-off that licensing does. Even if it manages to increase the
quality of the marginal service delivered, it would decrease the amount by making
access to medical services more difficult in the same way licensing requirements
does.
If the licensing requirements were too strict, having a net negative effect
on health, telemedicine, by improving access at the cost of lower quality, would
provide an improvement in health. On the other hand, if the licensing
requirements were adequate, telemedicine would worsen health. The caveat is that
the effect would depend on the relative qualities of telemedicine and traditional
medical care, but since the literature indicates only small differences in the quality
of the two types of service, this is not a concern in this case because this means
we are looking at the margin. It follows that if licensing requirements were too
strict and telemedicine improves outcomes, any regulation that prevents
telemedicine would worsen outcomes and reciprocally. Therefore, by looking at
the effect of a regulation that prevents physician-patient telemedicine, we can
infer whether the licensing requirements were too strict in the first place or quite
the opposite.
This paper finds that overall the level of licensing requirements is too
strict. I find evidence that support the idea that telecare is a lower quality service
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with higher incidence of medical mistakes but at the same time brings real
improvements in health especially in predominantly rural states.
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CONCLUSIONS

Government policies adopted at the request of various segments of the
population have side-effects that may prove detrimental to other segments of
population, sometimes offsetting their intended positive impact. This body of
work concentrates on identifying the impact on health of three different
government policies: labor income taxes, non economic damages caps, and the
regulation that requires physicians to perform a physical examination before
prescribing drugs.
I find that both higher and more progressive labor income taxes lead to a
decline in health, that non-economic damages caps lead to a decrease in the
amount of many types of medical services delivered, and that hindering
telemedicine by requiring physicians to perform a physical examination before
they are allowed to prescribe drugs leads to worse health outcomes.
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APPENDIX

SF12 questionaire
The SF-12 (short-form 12-question questionnaire) measures self-reported
mental and physical health. The questionnaire was administered to respondents
who had turned 40 since their last interview in 1998, 2000, and 2002. Based on
these 12 questions, 2 summary scores were created (by the Center for Human
Resources Research, CHRR), the physical and the mental score. This research
uses only the physical score.
SF12 questionaire
1)

ASSESSMENT OF RESPONDENT'S GENERAL HEALTH: In general,

would you say your health is ....
2)

DOES RESPONDENT'S HEALTH LIMIT MODERATE ACTIVITIES?

The following items are activities you might do during a typical day. Does your
health limit you in these activities?... Moderate activities, such as moving a table,
pushing a vacuum cleaner, bowling or playing golf?
3)

DOES RESPONDENT'S HEALTH LIMIT CLIMBING STAIRS?....

Climbing several flights of stairs?

4)

HAS RESPONDENT ACCOMPLISHED LESS THAN WOULD LIKE

IN PAST 4 WEEKS? During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following
problems with your work or other regular daily activities as a result of your
physical health?
5)

..... Accomplished less than you would like?

HEALTH LIMIT KIND OF WORK OR OTHER ACTIVITIES? .... Were

limited in the kind of work or other activities?
6)

HAVE EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS CAUSED RESPONDENT TO

ACCOMPLISH LESS IN PAST 4 WEEKS? During the past 4 weeks, have you
had any of the following problems with your work or other regular daily activities
as a result of any emotional problems (such as feeling depressed or anxious)?
(Please answer YES or NO for each question.).... Accomplished less than you
would like?
7)

HAVE EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS MADE RESPONDENT LESS

CAREFUL IN PAST 4 WEEKS? .... Didn't do work or other activities as
carefully as usual?
8)

PAIN INTERFERED WITH NORMAL WORK IN PAST 4 WEEKS?

During the past 4 weeks, how much did pain interfere with your normal work
(including both work outside of the home and housework)?
9)

HOW OFTEN RESPONDENT FELT CALM AND PEACEFUL IN

PAST 4 WEEKS The next questions are about how you feel and how things have
been with you during the past 4 weeks. for each question, please give the one
answer that comes closest to the way you have been feeling. How often during the
past 4 weeks........ have you felt calm and peaceful?
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10)

HOW OFTEN RESPONDENT HAD A LOT OF ENERGY IN PAST 4

WEEKS .... Did you have a lot of energy?
11)

HOW OFTEN RESPONDENT FELT DOWN-HEARTED AND BLUE

IN PAST 4 WEEKS
12)

.... Have you felt down-hearted and blue?

RS PHYSICAL/EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS INTERFER WITH SOCIAL

ACIVITIES IN PAST 4 WEEKS During the past 4 weeks, how much of the time
has your physical health or emotional problems interfered with your social
activities (like visiting with friends, relatives, etc.)?
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Table A1. Descriptive Statistics NLSY791

Variable

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Source

Physical Score

SF12 physical score (standardized)

0.010

0.988

NLSY79

Median hourly wage of Healthcare

21.170

2.436

BLS

303.291

105.470

5.287

1.327

Medical Care Cost

practitioners and technical occupations
State Health and

Census

Hospital Expenditures
Sales Tax

percent

B.o.S

Education

Years of education at interview

13.570

2.485

NLSY79

ASVAB

Overall Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude

51.273

28.792

NLSY79

Female

dummy=1 if female

0.502

0.500

NLSY79

Black

dummy=1 if Black or African-American

0.131

0.337

NLSY79

Hispanic

dummy=1 if Hispanic

0.059

0.236

NLSY79

If Married

dummy=1 if married

0.653

0.476

NLSY79

Father Health Problem

dummy=1 if father had health problems

0.491

0.500

NLSY79

Mother Health Problem

dummy=1 if mother had health problems

0.436

0.496

NLSY79

Both Parents until 18

dummy=1 if lived with both parents till 18

0.714

0.452

NLSY79

Urban

dummy=1 if lives in urban area

0.665

0.472

NLSY79

Interview 1998

dummy=1 if interviewed in 1998

0.257

0.437

NLSY79

Interview 2000

dummy=1 if interviewed in 2000

0.386

0.487

NLSY79

State Age Structure

% of population between 50 and 65

0.159

0.009

Census

% of population over 65 (2002)

0.125

0.018

Census

Test score (AFQT score) (percentile)

State Salaries
Structure

Property Crime

% of population with salary income of
20000-30000

0.146

0.013

IRS

30000-50000

0.197

0.009

IRS

50000-75000

0.146

0.014

IRS

75000-100000

0.077

0.012

IRS

100000-200000

0.068

0.020

IRS

>200000

0.019

0.007

IRS

3589.004

774.777

Census

13.855

62.870

Census

0.015

0.004

Census

Property Crime per 100,000 population

Severance Tax
Gov. Employment

Full-time equivalent Gov. Empl. per capita

Population

in thousands

11200

8870

Census

Dem./Rep Ratio House

1.190

0.824

B.o.S.

Dem./Rep Ratio Senate

1.097

0.794

B.o.S.

NLSY79: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979; Census: www.census.org or from The
Statistical Abstract of the United States 2003; IRS: Internal Revenue Service, United States
Department of Treasury; B.o.S.: The Book of the States, Lexington KY., Council of State
Governments, 2002; 1 Weighted statistics; Number of observations: 4304
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics: CPS and BRFFS1

CPS2
Variable
Health Status

Mean

BRFFS3
Std. Dev.

3.612

Mean

Std. Dev.

19.545

10.707

1.118

Number days good
physical health/month
Medical Care Cost

21.360

2.539

22.324

2.583

306.419

105.207

336.965

93.397

High-School

0.327

0.469

0.273

0.446

Some College

0.263

0.440

0.292

0.455

College Degree

0.175

0.380

0.294

0.456

> College

0.107

0.309

Female

0.514

0.500

0.569

0.495

Black

0.109

0.312

0.093

0.291

Hispanic

0.110

0.313

0.148

0.355

50.633

7.165

50.555

7.200

If Married

0.693

0.461

0.680

0.466

Metropolitan

2.529

0.964

State Health and
Hospital Expenditures

(or more for BRFFS)

Age

1

Weighted statistics
2
Number of observations: 65042
3
Number of observations: 15124
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Table A3. Self-reported Health in England and the United States, Ages 55-64

England
Unweighted sample size

3681

Diabetes

USA
4386

6.1

12.5***

33.8

42.4***

All heart disease

9.6

15.1***

Myocardial infarction

4

Stroke

2.3

3.8***

Lung disease

6.3

8.1***

Cancer

5.5

9.5***

Hypertension

5.4***

English data are from the first wave of English Longitudinal Survey of Aging, and US data are
from the 2002 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey. All data are weighted. *** significant at
1%, ** significant at 5% significance level.
Source: Oldfield, Zoe, and James P. Smith, “Disease and Disadvantage in the United States and
England,” Journal of American Medical Association, 295(17), May 3, 2006: 2037-2045.
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